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Integrating Subchapters K and s-Just Do It
WALTER D. SCHWIDETZKY*

I. Introduction
The Code contains two "pass-through" tax regimes for business entities. One
is contained in Subchapter K, which applies to partnerships~ the other in
Subchapter S, which, unsurprisingly, applies to S corporations. In the main:>
both Subchapters tax the owners of the entities rather than the entities them.selves. Having two pass-through tax regimes creates obvious adm.inistrative and other inefficiencies. There was a time when S corporations served
a valuable purpose, particularly when taxpayers needed a fairly sim.ple and
foolproof pass-through entity that provided a liability shield. But limited
liability companies (LLCs), which are usually taxed as partnerships,l in most
contexts m.ake S corporations obsolete. LLCs too can be fairly siIllple and
foolproof, while providing the superior tax benefits of the partnership provisions of Subchapter K.2 The advent and popularity of LLCs means that the
inefficiency created by two separate pass-through tax regiIlles can no longer
be justified. I propose that a new pass-through regime be created that retains
Subchapter K and incorporates the best parts of Subchapter S, with the balance of Subchapter S repealed. Integrating these two pass-through regim.es
requires that some changes be made to the C corporation provisions of
Subchapter C as well. I also make Subchapter K available to IllOSt nonpublic
C corporations, putting rnost closely held businesses on a level playing field.
It has been difficult to justify Subchapter S for some time. In 1996, I
published an article recommending the repeal of Subchapter S. 3 In a rather
novel experience for a law professor, in 2004 there was a bill in the House of

·Professor of Law. University of Baltimore. School of Law; I would like to thank Professor
William Lyons of the University of Nebraska College of Law, Professor Fred Brown of the
University of Baltimore School of Law, Pcofessor Sean M. O'Connor of the University of
Washington School of Law, the participants at the 2008 Washburn University School of Law
Partnership Tax Symposium, and the participants in the tax meetings of the 2008 Law and
Society Conference (organized by Professor Neil Buchanan of George Washington University
School of Law) for their decidedly helpful comments. This Article was written with the benefit
of a research stipend from the University of Baltimore School of Law, for which I am grate-

fuL
I See infra text accompanying notes 10-18.
2See infra text accompanying notes 62-104.
3Walter D. Schwidetzky, Is It TIme To Give The S Corporation A Proper Burial?, 15 VA. TAX
R£v. 591 (1996) (hereinafter S Corp. Burial]. I draw freely from that article in writing this
one.
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Representatives that would have, among other things, enacted my proposal. 4
The bill, however, never became law and the tax system remains saddled with
both tax partnerships and S corporations.
The tax universe today is very different from. that of 1996. I continue to
believe that Subchapter S should be repealed. It remains inefficient to have
two pass-through tax regimes, and the repeal of Subchapter S is much more
politically realistic than the repeal of Subchapter K, and indeed, perhaps more
realistic today than it was in 1996. But there is also much additional grist for
the mill, and, with a little prodding from som.e colleagues, I am reexamining
the area. I am encouraged in my efforts by the fact that business entity tax
reform is receiving heightened attention in Congress. 5
S corporations offer a number oflegitirnate benefits not currently available
to tax partnerships and those benefits should be incorporated into Subchapter
K. Many of these benefits have corne to me fore since my 1996 article. Some
derive from the simple fact that the S corporation is a corporation. For example, parties who anticipate a public offering often use an S corporation, as it
is a sitnple matter to convert it to a C corporation prior to the public offering.
Etnployee Stock Option Plans, which by definition can only own corporate
stock, often own stock in S corporations. S corporations are often preferred
by the venture capital industry. The hope is that the S corporation will be able
to tnake a public offering of its stock, or that the S corporation will become
the target of a friendly takeover by. a public corporation. Those takeovers are
much easier to structure on a tax-friendly basis if the target is a corporation.
How can the needs of the parties making these and similar uses of S corporations be met in a world without Subchapter S? The solution I propose is to
make it easier for partnerships to incorporate than is currently the case.
Another benefit of S corporations is the so-called <'capital gain freeze" where
taxpayers sell real property to an S corporation to "freeze" existing long-term
capital gains before developing the property. I recommend that a comparable
benefit be tnade available in Subchapter K.
The changed tax and business environment cause me to recommend a
bolder, more comprehensive approach than that which I recommended in
my 1996 article. As noted above, I now recommend that almost all nonpublicly traded corporations be allowed to elect to be taxed under Subchapter
K. Closely held businesses should at least have the option of playing on the
same field.
S corporations are also often used to improperly reduce or eliminate Social
Security and Medicare taxes. The elimination of S corporations will, of course,
end this abuse.

4Srnall Business Modernization Act of 2004. H.R. 4137. 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter
H.R. 4137].
5See J. CoMM. ON TAX'N. llOTH CONG., TAX REFORM: SELECTED FEDERAL TAX ISSUES
RELATING To SMALL BUSINESS AND CHOICE OF BUSINESS, (Comrn.. Print 2008), availabk at
http://wwvv.house.govl;ct/x-48-08.pdf [hereinafter JCX-48-08].
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But the repeal of Subchapter S will make more acute a problem that currently exists with the Social Security and Medicare tax provisions. These taxes
are meant to apply to income from services. but the current rules may over- or
understate the applicable tax liability. In conjunction with any business entity
tax reform:t Congress must more dearly address when income is from services
(and thus subject to these taxes) and when income is from capital (and thus
not so subject). I recommend that, aside from portfolio income, all income
of partnerships that are primarily engaged in the performance of services be
subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. For capital intensive partnerships, on the other hand, I recomm.end that partners be required to be paid
reasonable compensation for their services. and that only this compensation
be subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes.
Part II of the Article discusses the tax entity selection process generally, as
well as the basics of the taxation of C corporations, S corporations, and partnerships. Part III explores the tax advantages and disadvantages of partnerships and S corporations. Part IV looks at the data on the relative popularity
of the major business entities and provides a possible explanation for the
continued popularity of S corporations. Part V discusses H.R. 4137, a bill
that was ahead of its time (and not unflawed). Part VI asks whether we should
repeal Subchapter K instead. Part VII recommends that nonpublic corporations also be allowed to elect Subchapter K. Part VIII proposes taxpayerfriendly methods for getting to my version of the prolTIised land, and Part IX
gives a brief conclusion.

II. Context
A. Tax Entity Pigeon-Holing'
As a general principle, for federal tax purposes, businesses have three entities
from which to choose: The C corporation, the S corporation, and the tax
partnership. State law corporations are always classified as corporations for
federal tax purposes (C or S).7 State law unincorporated business entities, on
the other hand, might be classified as any of these three entities for federal tax
purposes (or if they have a single owner, silTIply be disregarded for federal tax
purposes). 8 Thus, a partnership for federal tax purposes may be something
very different for state law purposes. The ubiquitous example is the LLC,9
which is not a partnership for state law purposes, but typically is a partnerG For those with tax expertise. what follows belabors the obvious. Think of it as outreach to
rookies and foreign cross-trainers.
7Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(l).
8See Reg. § 301.7701-3. Of course, an individual doing business alone. and not through an
entity. conducts business as a sole proprietorship. but that is not normally thought of as a separate entity. Since it lacks any type of liability shield. it is also usually an unintelligent choice.
Further. there are what might be called special-use entities that operate outside this universe.
Examples include regulated investment companies. better known as ruCs or mutual funds.
and real estate investment trusts. better known as REITs. See I.R.C. §§ 851. 856.
9 A less ubiquitous example is the business trust.
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ship for federal tax purposes. These differences between state law classification
of business entities and federal tax law classification of those entities prompt
use of the somewhat awkward term "tax partnership.) To the extent possible)
I will avoid this awkward term. In general~ when I refer to a partnership~ I
mean an entity treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes.
Tax classification of entities has a long, at times combative, and often
tedious history. 10 The Service finally grew weary of the effort it had to expend
on tax classification issues, and quite sensibly came out with the "Check
the Box Regulations" in 1996, which dramatically sirnplified things. 11 An
eligible~ unincorporated state law entity generally may choose its status for
federal tax purposes.1 2 If the "eligible entity"13 makes no election, it is disregarded for federal tax purposes if it has a single lTlember (making it thus a
"disregarded entity"),14 and it is taxed as a partnership if it has two or more
nlernbers.ls Alternatively, the entity may "check the box," that is, elect to be
taxed as a C corporation or, if it meets the qualifications, an S corporation. 16
It would be out of the ordinary for an entity to check the box to be taxed as
a C corporation,17 and somewhat unusual to check the box to be taxed as an
S corporation, inducing sorne to say it makes more sense to call thern the
"Don't Check the Box" Regulations. 18

10 See BORlS BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, § 2.01-2.04 (2000) [hereinafter BrITKER & EUSTICE].
11 Simplification of Entity Classification Rules. 61 Fed. Reg. 66584 (Dec. 18, 1996) (to be
codified at 26 C.P.R. pt. 1); Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3.
12Reg. § 301.7701-3(a),-3(b)(1). There are a number of exceptions. Insurance companies,
banks, entities owned by a state or a political subdivision of a state, and entities taxable as corporations under provisions of the Code other than section 7701 (a)(3) are taxed as C corporations. See Reg. § 301.7701-2(b). My focus here is on state law, i.e. domestic entities. The rules
are different for foreign entities. See Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(B). -3(b)(2).
13 An eligible entity is an entity that is not classified under the Regulations as a corporation.
See Reg. 301.7701-3(a). Actual state law corporations are classified as corporations for federal
income tax purposes. Other per se tax corporations include insurance companies and certain
banks (though they typically also operate using a state law corporation). See Reg. § 301.77012(b).
14If the sole owner of the eligible entity is an individual, for tax purposes the entity is treated
as a sole proprietorship. If the sole owner is a corporation, the entity is treated as a division or
branch of the corporation. See Reg. § 301.7701-3(b).

15Id.
16Reg. § 301.7701-3(c).
17But it is not unheard of. Indeed, if one prefers to be a C corporation, it can make sense to
form a state law LLC rather that a state law corporation and check the box. LLCs commonly
have ITlore ITlodern "statutory architecture," ITleaning they are more flexible and have a lesser
reporting burden than corporations. See CARTER BISHOP & DANIEL KLEINBERGER. LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAw! 1.02 [hereinafter BISHOP & KLEINBERGER).
t8See, e.g., LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK § 3 (Mark Sargent &
Walter
Schwidetzky eds., 2008).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 62. NO.3
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B. C Corporations
C corporations are not beloved because they are subject to two levels of tax.
The C corporation is subject to a tax on its income at the corporate leveL 19
and when the C corporation pays dividends, the shareholders who receive
them are taxed again, typically at a 150/0 rate. 20 A distribution is only a dividend to the extent of a C corporation's nearnings and profits."21 Earnings
and profits, to put it very roughly, are undistributed net earnings of a C
corporation. 22 A contribution of property to the C corporation in exchange
for stock is not taxable to the corporation under section 1032, but is a fully
taxable exchange to the contributing shareholders unless the shareholders
transferring the property have control of the corporation immediately after
the transfer, defined, to oversimplify a bit, as 800/0 of the stock. 23 If a C corporation makes a nonliquidating distribution of assets to its shareholders, it
must recognize any gain inherent in those assets at the corporate level, but
is denied any such loss.24 If it is a liquidating distribution, gains are recognized and losses may be recognized by the C corporation. 25 On liquidation,
shareholders generally recognize a capital gain or loss based on the difference
between the money and fair market value of what is received and the basis
in their stock, again assuring two levels of tax. In either a nonliquidating or
liquidating distribution, the recipient shareholder takes a fair market value
basis in the distributed property.26
One might think that no one in his right mind would ever use a C corporation and indeed, most right-minded people do not. But there are exceptions,
three of which deserve to be highlighted. Publicly traded entities normally are
taxed as C corporations, so a business planning a public offering, especially

19 See I.R.C. § 11.
20See I.R.C. § 1 (h) (I 1). If you want more detail, see BITTKER &: EUSTICE, supra note 10.
! 8.01-8.05. A dividend received deduction is available to corporate shareholders under section 243.
21See LRC. §§ 301(c)(l), 316. Distributions in excess of earnings and profits generally
recover basis and then are treated as gain from the sale of the underlying stock. See LR.C.
§ 301 (c)(I)-(2).
22Numerous special calculations apply. See BITTKER &: EUSTICE, supra note 10, , 8.039.04.
23I.R.C. §§ 351(a). 368(c). Specifically, the owners must own stock (previously held or
received on the exchange) possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entided to vote and at least 800/0 of the total number of shares of all other classes
of stock of the corporation. I.R.C. § 368(c).
24I.RC. §§ 301(d). 311. The gains increase earnings and profits. Reg. § 1.312-7(b)(I).
25 See I.R.C. § 336(a). Losses inherent in distributed corporate assets may only be recognized
on a liquidating distribution, and then there are limits. See LRC. § 336(d). The recipient
shareholder takes a fair market value basis in the property received. I.R.C. § 334(a). Gain or
loss is generally not recognized on the liquidation of a corporate subsidiary and the corporate
shareholder takes a carryover basis in the assets. See LR.C. §§ 332, 334(b).
26LR.C. §§ 301 (d). 334(a).
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an iInmediate one, might form a C corporation froIll the outset. 27 It Illight
also select an S corporation and then switch to C corporation status, as I
discuss below. C corporations often are preferred in international transactions. Foreign countries Illay find it difficult to classify, and indeed Illay be
cOIllpletely fluIllmoxed by, U.S. tax partnerships such as LLCs.28 Further, and
Illore importantly, many tax treaties that the U.S. has with foreign countries
give preferential treatment to dividend payments, making the C corporation
(the only entity capable of paying a dividend) a rational choice for a U.S.
business's foreign activities. 29 The sometimes awkward operation of the U.S.
branch profits tax also can make U.S. C corporation subsidiaries preferable
for the U.S. business activities of many foreign corporations. 30 Finally, one
rnight select a C corporation for an extra "run up" the tax brackets. Under
section 11, the rates of tax on C corporation taxable income range from 15%
on the first $50,000 and 25% on the next $25,000 up to 350/0 on incoIlle
over $10 Illillion. 31 The maximum individual income tax rate is 350/0 under
section 1 (i). A taxpayer whose marginal tax rate is 350/0 might be tempted to
collect additional incorne in a C corporation to take advantage of the lower
corporate rates, especially on taxable income up to $75,000. There are Code
sections that would get in the way of serious abuse in this regard, including a
flat tax rate of 350/0 for personal service corporations in section 11 (b)(2) , the
accumulated earnings tax of section 531, and the personal holding company
tax of section 54 ~. But rninor game playing, which in the aggregate may cost

27 A publicly traded partnership is normally taxed as a C corporation. though there is an
exception for publicly traded partnerships 90% or more of whose income is from certain passive sources. See LR.C. § 7704.
28 For the German take on limited liability companies. see generally Helmut Krabbe.
Steuerliche Einordnung tier nach dem Recht tier Bundesstaaten der USA gegrondeten Limited
Liability Company, 10 INTERNATIONALE STEUERRECHT [ISTR] 351 (2004); Christiana
Djanani, et al., Die Einordnungder LLC nach innerstaatlichem deutschen und US-amerikanischen
Steuerrecht. 14 INTERNATIONALE STEUERRECHT [ISTR] 481 (2004).
29 See, e.g., Convention Between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes. U.S.-ER.G. art. 10(2), Aug. 29, 1989.
5 U.S.T. 2768. An outbound transaction is one in which a U.S. taxpayer invests outside the
United States.
30The U.S. corporate subsidiaries are always C corporations as corporations and nonresident
aliens cannot be shareholders of an S corporation. See LR.C. § 1361(b). For a discussion of
why a foreign corporation would prefer to operate with a U.S. corporate subsidiary rather than
a branch. see generally Fred Brown, Reforming the Branch Projirs Tax to Advance Neutrality. 25
VA. TAX REv. 1219 (2006).
31The rate goes to 340/0 for taxable income above $75,000 but not exceeding $10 million,
and 35 % for taxable income over $10 million. The benefit of the graduated rates below 340/0
are phased out for corporations with taxable income between $100,000 and $335,000, and
the 340/0 rate is phased out for corporations with taxable income over $15 million. See l.R.C.
§ 11. Note that the application of section 199 can result in a lower effective tax rate. The tax
rate on dividends paid to individuals is generally 15 % • See I.R.C. § 1 (h)(ll).
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the fisc dearly~ is possible and is reported to take place. 32
Lest I leave the novice reader with the impression that all C corporation
users are stuck with a double tax, let tne quickly add that this is far from
necessarily the case. C corporations often seek to «zero out)) their income
by, atnong other things, paying deductible salaries to shareholder-employees,
paying deductible interest to shareholder-creditors, and paying deductible
rent to shareholder-landlords. Many a lawyer has becotne enriched doing
battle in court over what counts as a reasonable salary, a reasonable atnount
of debt. or a reasonable atnount of rent. 33 Further, the deductibility of interest
when contrasted with the nondeductibility of dividends can encourage a C
corporation to have an excessively debt-heavy financial structure. 34
The relatively new tax rate on dividends of 150/035 sotnetimes stands the
corporate tax world on its head. Salary, interest incotne, and rents are all taxed
at ordinary incotne rates of up to 350/0. It can tnake more sense to pay a nondeductible dividend than, for exatnple. a deductible salary to a shareholderemployee, especially for C corporations with low tnarginal income tax rates
that have shareholders with high marginal rates. This change of pace is utterly
counterintuitive to battle-hardened tax veterans.

C. S Corporations
S corporations were in many respects designed with the smaller business in
mind, though there is no dollar limit on their size. and many are quite sizeable with numerous employees. 36 An S corporation is a pass-through entity.
Generally, there is no corporate level tax. Instead, to recite the statutory
litany, income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit of the S corporation flow
through to, and are taken into account by. the shareholders, retaining the
character they had at the corporate level. 37 Allocations of these itern.s to the
shareholders are based on shareholders' percentage of stock holdings. 38 An S
corporation is subject to the Subchapter C rules for property contributions
and distributions. Thus, a contribution of property to the S corporation in
32 See John W. Lee. A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey
the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do, .. 78 TEX. L. REv. 995 (1999).
33 See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10. , 8.05.
34 See I.R.C. § 163(a); see generally, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLlCY,

APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX. SYSTEM FOR THE
21 ST CENTURY (Dec. 20, 2007). In one of the more hilarious chapters of tax history (yes. it is
possible for tax to be funny), Congress in 1969 enacted section 385, authorizing the Service to
issue regulations defining debt and equity. The Service tried early on, got shot down. and has
not worked up the nerve to try again since. Some 40 years have gone by since the enactment
of section 385, and we are still waiting for the regulations (not that many tax advisors want
the Service to work up that nerve). See James Eustice, <Debt-Like' Equity & 'Equity-Like' Debt:
Treasury's Anti-Hybrid Proposals, 71 TAX NOTES (TA) 1657. 1657 (June 17. 1996).
35 See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Act of2003. Pub. L. No. 08-27. 117 Stat. 752 (2003).
*'See BITTKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10,,6.01.
37 See I.RC. § 1366.
38I.R.C. § 1377(a).
Tax l1!Jwyer, Vol. 62, No.3
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exchange for stock only goes untaxed if the contributors meet the 800/0 control test of section 351 (a) ifllmediately after the contribution. 39 Further, the
S corporation recognizes gain (which normally goes untaxed at the corporate
level and flows through to shareholders along with other corporate income)
when it distributes appreciated property to shareholders.40 Losses inherent
in distributed property may only be recognized in a liquidating distribution,
and then limitations apply.41
Generally,. a shareholdees share of the S corporation's income increases her
basis in her stock, and losses and distributions reduce that basis. 42 Losses filay
only be deducted to the extent of the stock basis and any basis in debt the
corporation owes the shareholder.43 Unused losses may be carried forward
indefinitely.44 Distributions generally are not taxable to the shareholder unless
the amount of money and fair market value of property distributed exceed
the shareholder's stock basis. The excess is viewed as gain from the sale of the
stoCk. 45
This rather pleasant state of affairs changes if the S corporation has previously been a C corporation or been combined on a tax favored basis (i. e.
without being fully taxed) with a C corporation. As long as it meets the qualification requirefilents, there are no restrictions on a C corporation becoming
an S corporation. Further, the reorganization rules of section 368 apply to S
corporations. Thus,. for example,. it is possible for a C corporation to merge
tax free into an S corporation. 46
An S corporation does not ordinarily pay dividends. That is the province of
C corporations. Only a C corporation can generate earnings and profits. 47 An
S corporation can, however, inherit the earnings and profits of a C corporation if it was once a C corporation or if a C corporation merged into it. 48 If
an S corporation has earnings and profits, it is possible for the S corporation
to distribute a dividend which, like any dividend,. is income to the recipient
shareholder (and that thus does not fall under the distribution rules described
above). To simplify a bit, an S corporation generally is considered to first
make distribution of its own net earnings. Distributions in excess of its own
net earnings generally come out of the earnings and profits, and thus constitute dividends and income to the shareholders, until the earnings and profits
are eliminated. 49 Dividends do not affect shareholders' stock bases. 50
39I.RC. §§ 351(a), 368(c); see supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
4°I.R.C. § 311 (h).
41 See I.R.C. § 336.
42I.R.C. § 1367.
43I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1).
44I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2).
4sI.R.C. § 1368.
46See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
47 See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
48See I.R.C. § 381(a).
49See I.R.C. § 1368(c).
50See I.R.C. § 301(c).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 62, No. 3
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Section 1374 applies a corporate level tax on the S corporation at the highest C corporation tax rate when the gains from certain assets are recognized.
Covered assets are those held by the C corporation at the time it makes an S
election or those that find their way from a C corporation into an S corporation on a tax favored basis, such as through a merger. 51 Section 1374 ceases
to apply ten years after the C corporation makes the S election or after an
asset finds its tax favored way into S corporation solution. 52 Additionally, section 1375 applies a corporate level tax at the highest C corporation tax rate
to "excess net passive income"53 if the S corporation has earnings and profits. 54 Passive income is income from sources such as dividends and royalties. 55
Generally, net passive inco.me is gross passive inco.me .minus expenses to earn
it and excess net passive inco.me is net passive income in excess of 250/0 of
gross receipts. In sections 1374 and 1375, Congress is clearly trying to preserve the double taxation attributable to the erstwhile C corporation.
The rules governing qualification as an S corporation also can present problems. These rules have been dramatically liberalized over the years, in part to
make the S corporation more competitive with partnerships, but still provide
very real limits on the use of S corporations. An S corporation fllay not have
more than 100 shareholders56 (as recently as 1995 it was 35 shareholders, 57
and in the early days it was ten shareholders58), and may not have more than

51 See

I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(l)(A), 1374(a), and 381(a); see also Reg. § 1. 1374-1 (e).
the maximum gain subject to the section 1374 tax cannot exceed the net gain
inherent in the C corporation assets at the time of the S election or at the time of the tax-favored transfer to the S corporation. The gain recognized under section 1374 on any individual
asset cannot exceed the net gain inherent in it at either of those times.
53 Essentially, passive investment income less the expenses to earn that income. See I.R.C.
§ 1375(b)(2).
54 Distributions deemed to corne out of earnings and profits are taxable dividends to the
recipient shareholders. I.R.C. § 1368(c)(2).
55See I.R.C. §§ 1375(b)(3), 1362(d)(3).
56 Actually. as members of a family can be treated as one shareholder, an S corporation can
have thousands of shareholders, albeit ones that are related. See I.R.C. § 1361 (c) (l)(A)(ii).
57I.R.C. § 1361 (b) (1)(A) (1995).
58S ee LR.C. § 137I(a) (1958).
52 Further.
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one class of stock (though differences in voting rights are allowed).59 There
are rules for who Dlay and who may not be S corporation shareholders. The
"Dlay not" group includes nonresident aliens, financial institutions that
use the reserve Dlethod of accounting contained in section 585 (applies to
Dlany banks), insurance companies, corporations electing under section 936
(which allows credits for certain incoDle froDl Puerto Rico), and Domestic
International Sale Corporations (now something of an antique, as they have
been held to violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).60 The
"Dlay" group is liDlited to individuals, their estates, certain trusts (in general,
voting trusts and trusts which are faDlily oriented), qualified pension trusts,
and section 510(c)(3) charitable organizations. Note that corporations (C
or S) are not on the allowed list of shareholders, so generally a corporation
Dlay not own stock in an S corporation. There is one limited exception: an S
corporation Dlayown a qualified Subchapter S corporate subsidiary (QSSS),
have the benefit of the subsidiary's liability shield for state law purposes, but
have the subsidiary ignored for tax purposes, with all income and expenses
flowing through to the parent. 61 It often makes Dlore sense, though, for the
S corporation to use a wholly owned LLC, as there are fewer qualification
requirements. There is no restriction the other way around, and an S corporation may own stock in a C corporation.
.
S corporations that once tangoed with C corporations have to be watch59LR.C. § 1361(b)(I), (2). A husband and wife and frunily members can be treated as one
shareholder. See I.RC. § 1361 (c) (I) (A), (B). Often it is not clear why certain of the limitations
on the use of S corporations were chosen. With regard to the one class of stock rule, however,
there is a hint in the legislative history in this regard. The original drafters of subchapter S
may have been concerned that the issuance of a class of preferred stock might have made it
difficult to tax current earnings to shareholders. They may also have questioned how to tax
dividends on preferred stock. See S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 4667 (1954), which briefly discusses
the complexities of having dividends on preferred stock in the context of a proposed bill that
foreshadowed subchapter S. As the use of the S corporation accumulated adjustment: account
and the proposed S Corporation Reform Act of 1995 demonstrate, these problems are solvable. See I.R.C. § 1368(c)(1), (e)(I); see also JAMES EUSTICE & JOEL KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS' 7.06 [hereinafter EUSTICE & KUNTZ]; Curtis J. Berger,
W(h}ither Partnership Taxation, 47 TAX L. REv. 105, 141-43 (1991).
As with all corporations that borrow funds from their shareholders, there is a risk that this
debt could be classified as equity, and thereby perhaps constitute the prohibited second class of
stock. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ,4.02. Section 1361(c)(5) provides some relief
in this regard, providing that irrespective of the debt to equity ratio. "straight debt" will not be
reclassified as equity. To qualify as straight debt. the debt must be payable on demand or at a
date certain, generally the interest rate must not be contingent. the debt must not be convertible, and the creditor must be an individual, an estate, a trust that qualifies as an S corporation
shareholder, or a commercial lender. See LR.C. § 165I(c)(5)(B).
6OLR.C. § 1361(b)(1)(C), (b)(2); see also Tax Understanding, Dec. 7-8, 1981, GATT
B.LS.D.28S/114.
61LR.C. § 1361(b)(3). Note that since an S corporation can own stock in other corporations, it can be part of an "affiliated group" (though outside of the QSSS rules, a corporation
may still not be a shareholder). This was once prohibited. See EUSTICE & KUNTZ, supra note
59, , 3.06.
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fut, but otherwise life is pretty good, or at least so it seems until the taxpayer
learns of the advantages of Subchapter K. The grass is always greener. As I will
discuss next, generally partnerships offer a still better tax deal than S corporations, but there are situations when S corporations have the upper hand. I will
address these advantages after the partnership discussion.

D. Partnerships
Partnerships are also not subject to an entity level tax. Items of incorne, gain,
loss, deduction, and credit flow through to, and are taken into account by, the
partners, retaining the character they have at the partnership leve1. 62 Taxable
income increases a partner's basis in his partnership interest; deductible loss
reduces that basis. 63 A partner may not deduct losses in excess of this "outside
basis," though unused losses may be carried forward indefinitely.64 Other pertinent details of partnership taxation follow.
Complexity is a large problem in the partnership tax arena. The partnership tax regirne need not make the life of a given taxpayer cornplex, but it
often does. As is not uncommon with tax law, there is tension between complexity and precision on the one hand, and adrninisterability and taxpayer
cornpliance on the other hand. Further, in a preview of things to come, that
complexity can lead to abuses, in which case there can be complexity and
imprecision, not the best of both worlds. 65

III. Advantages and Disadvantages of Partnerships and S Corporations

A. Advantages ofPartnerships over S Corporations
Most tax professionals will affirm that on balance a partnership is, from. a
federal incom.e tax perspective, superior to an S corporation. I now review
the advantages. I intersperse a few S corporation advantages in this discussion when they are directly related to the partnership advantage for easier and
m.ore efficient understanding. These interspersed S corporation advantages
are rarely, if ever, im.portant enough to cause one to prefer an S corporation to
a partnership. Those S corporation advantages that can make it the preferable
vehicle I discuss separately below.
1. Contributions and Distributions

Tax-free contributions of property are more readily achieved using the partnership form. Normally, no gain or loss is recognized on a contribution of
property to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest. 66 There is no
800/0 threshold as there is with corporations, in fact there is no threshold at
all.
62LR.C. § 702.
63I.R.C. § 705.
64I.R.C. § 704(d).
65For an exrunple of an abuse in this context. see Regulation section 1.701-2(d). ex. 9.
66I.R.C ..§ 721 (a).
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If a partner makes a contribution of property to a partnership> under section 704(c)(l)(A), any gain or loss inherent in the property on contribution is taxed to the contributing partner when the partnership disposes of
the property.67 There is no analogy to section 704(c)(1)(A) in Subchapter S.
Though a shareholder may make a tax-free contribution of property to an
S corporation under section 351 (a» upon disposition of that property, any
inherent gain or loss is allocated to all of the shareholders based on their stock
holdings. 68 Thus, a shareholder contributing appreciated property could. on
a disposition of the property by the S corporation, effectively shift a portion
of the gain to other shareholders.69 As a consequence of that gain, the other
shareholders could see their stock bases increase to an a.mount in excess of the
fair nIarket value of their stock. The other shareholders might not be able to
take advantage of the loss inherent in the stock until the stock is sold, which
could be well into the future. Further, the shareholders' recognized loss on the
stock normally is a capital loss whereas the gain on the sale of the contributed
property may be ordinary income, resulting in a character distortion in addition to a tinIing distortion. Finally, adding insult to injury, if a shareholder
with a loss in his stock dies before disposing of the stock, he takes his loss with
hi.m. 70 The loss disappears because his heirs take a fair market value basis in
the stock under section 1014.
The lack of an S corporation equivalent to section 704(c)(1)(A) can work to
the benefit of shareholders who contribute appreciated property because the
pre-acquisition gain is shifted to others, and to the disadvantage of shareholders who contribute nIoney. The converse is the case if depreciated property
is contributed. However, well-informed parties dealing at arm's length factor
this issue into the allocations of stock to the shareholders. In a family context>
where the parties are not dealing at arm's length, the lack of a section 704(c)
(1)(A) analog may permit some income shifting amongst the shareholders.
This can happen in a nonfamily context as welL where the shareholders to
whom the gain is shifted have offsetting net operating loss carryforwards or
are tax exempt. It seems unlikely, however, that given the other advantages of
Subchapter K, that the lack of a section 704(c)(I)(A) analog drives many, if
any, choice of entity decisions. 71
In contrast to an S corporation, generally no gain or loss is recognized
67There is a whole lot more to it than that. For example, tax depreciation generated by the
property is allocated to the other panners to the extent of their shares of "book depreciation."
Further, because section 704(c)(l)(A) by its terms can work imperfectly, Regulation section
1.704-3 provides three methods for applying it, the traditional method. the traditional method
with curative allocations, and the remedial method.
68I.R.C. § 1366(a).
69The converse is the case if the property has an inherent. recognizable loss, but in that event
the shareholder is more likely to sell the property and contribute me resulting cash.
70 As the heirs generally take a fair market value basis as of the date of death under section
1014, the loss is effectively eliminated. See I.R.C. § 1014.
71 Section 1366(e) limits some abuse in the S corporation context. The partnership rule has
a sounder tax and economic foundation.
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when a partnership distributes property to its partners. 72 Normally the recipient partner takes a carryover basis in the distributed propertyJ3 Obviously,
the partnership rules are normally more favorable to taxpayers than the S
corporation rules. Further, the tax cost of withdrawing property froITl an S
corporation is often too high to justify the distribution. Current law prevents
many S corporations froIn liquidating and converting to other forms of business enterprise, even if they would otherwise prefer to.
Sections 707(a)(2)(b), 704(c) (1) (B) and 737 contain cOInplex rules
designed to prevent taxpayers froITl using the tax-free contribution and distribution rules for partnerships to disguise what is in substance a taxable sale or
exchange.74 There is no analog in the S corporation provisions. Of course, in
an S corporation it is Inore difficult to Inake a tax-free contribution, and any
gain inherent in distributed property is recognized on distribution. 75 These
disadvantages Inake a cOITlparable anti-abuse rule for S corporations less necessary.

2. Allocations
A partnership is allowed to make "special allocations" to its partners. For
eXaInple, SOIneone who is otherwise a 500/0 partner can be allocated 90 0/0 of

nLR.C. § 731 (a).
73LR.C. § 732(a)(1). However, that basis can never exceed the recipient partner's basis in his
or her partnership interest. LR.C. § 732(a)(2).
74Section 707(a)(2)(B) was Congress's first pass at this area. It addresses the situation in
which chere is a direct or indirect transfer of money or property by a partner to a partnership
and a related direct or indirect transfer of ITloney or other property by the partnership to the
partner. If the facts indicate chat the transfers are in substance a sale or exchange, that is how
they are treated (and not as a nontaxable contribution and distribution under sections 721
and 731). The Regulations provide a presuITlption that if the exchanges take place within two
years of one another, there is a rebuttable presumption that they are related, subject: to some
exceptions. Reg. § 1.707-3(c)(I).
Sect:ion 704(c)(1)(B) of the Code provides that if a partner contributed property to a partnership and that property is distributed to another partner within seven years of the contribution, the contributing partner recognizes any gain or loss froITl the sale of the property.
The gain or loss recognized is the aITlount that would have been recognized under section
704(c)(l)(A) if the property had been sold at its fair market value at the time of the distribution.
Section 737 of the Code provides that if a partner contributes appreciated property to a
partnership. and other property is distributed to the contributing partner within seven years,
the contributing partner recognizes gain to the extent of the lesser of the aJTI.ount by which the
fair ITlarket value of the distributed property exceeds the partner's basis in his or her partnership
interest or the net precontribution gain. The net precontribution gain is defined as the gain
that would have been recognized under section 704(c)(I)(B) if the contributed property had
been distributed to another partner within seven years of the contribution.
Note that section 707(a)(2)(B) does not autoITlatically apply, whereas sections 704(c)(1)(B)
and 737 do. If it does apply, section 707(a)(2)(B) makes the transaction fully taxable. That is
not necessarily the case with the other two code sections.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
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the depreciation deductions. 76 In an S corporation~ all allocations of income,
loss or deductions, must be based on the shareholders' stock holdings. 77 Under
certain circumstances:> an S corporation can effectively vary that allocation.
It can pay a shareholder-employee a larger salary in a given year. A deserving shareholder-employee can be given an option to buy stock that can be
exercised to increase corporate ownership, and thereby increase income and
loss allocations. 78 "While these substitute methods can be helpfuL they are just
that, substitute methods, and do not offer the flexibility of the special allocations rules available to the partnership form.

3. Entity Debt"
Under section 752, an increase in a partnees share of partnership liabilities
is treated as though the partner contributed money to the partnership to the
extent of her share of partnership liabilitiesJ9 Like any other contribution,
these amounts increase the partner's basis in her partnership interest. 8o It is
difficult to overstate the value of being able to increase outside basis with
partnership debt. A partner is allowed to deduct her share of partnership
losses to the extent of that basis. sl
In all but one of the circuits that have examined the issue, debt incurred
by an S corporation does not increase the shareholders' stock bases, even if
the shareholders' guarantee the debt and the creditors view the shareholders

761n order for a special allocation to be allowed. under the safe harbor it must have "substantial economic effect." I.R.C. § 704(b). The substantial economic effect test has two parts, the
"economic effect test" and the "substantiality test." Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(vii)(2).
In order for the economic effect test to be met, partners' capital accounts must be maintained in accordance with certain rules. The capital accounts must be increased for the fair
market value of contributed property (net of associated debt), money contributed, and allocable partnership income. The capital accounts must be decreased for the fair market value of
distributed property. money distributed. and partnership losses. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(b).
The other requirements of the economic effect test are that a partner must be paid the balance of her capital account on liquidation of her interest. and if a partner has a deficit capital
account, she must restore it on liquidation of that interest. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(2)(ii). Under an
alternative safe harbor, an allocation is allowed even if a partner does not have a deficit restoration obligation, provided, inter alia, the allocation does not cause or increase a deficit account
balance. These are sometimes known as the qualified income offset or «QIO" rules. See Reg.
§ 1.704-1 (b)(2) (ii)(d).
The substantiality test requires that the economic effect of an allocation of a partner be
"real." For example. if a partner is allocated a loss, on a present value, after tax basis, his position must be diminished and that of the other partners must be enhanced. If this does not
occur, the economic effect of the allocation is not substantial. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iii).
77I.R.C. § 1366(a).
78This option should not violate the one-class-of-stock rule. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(4)(iii)(B)
(2).
79 Similarly, a decrease in a partner's share of partnership liabilities is treated as a distribution
of money. I.RC. § 752(b).
8°I.R.C. § 705(a)(1).
81$ubject to the loss limitation provisions of Code sections 465 and 469.
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as the prirnary payors. 82 A shareholder of an S corporation can only deduct
losses to the extent of the basis in the stock plus the basis of any loans by
the shareholder to the corporation. 83 A shareholder's inability to include an
appropriate share of corporate debt in stock basis can thus be troublesorne.
To avoid the iInpact of this rule, a shareholder can borrow the funds directly
and then loan or contribute the funds to the corporation, thereby receiving
an increased stock or debt basis, against which losses can be deducted. Not all
shareholders are well enough advised to know to borrow the funds directly.
Further, when the debt is secured, loaning the funds via a shareholder is
often awkward. Who would own the secured property, the corporation or the
shareholder? If the corporation, why would the corporation provide security
for a loan to a shareholder? Is the provision of security a distribution to the
shareholder? If the shareholder owns the security, is it property the corporation needs? Would it have to be rented to the corporation? Is adequate liability insurance available to protect the corporation and the shareholder against
rnishaps while the corporation uses the property? What if an S corporation
(especially one with nurnerous shareholders) wants to buy a property subject
to debt? Is it practical to have the shareholders buy the property, contribute
it to the corporation, but stay pritnarily liable on the debt? What if the debt
secured by the property is nonrecourse and therefore it is not possible for the
shareholders contributing the property to remain liable on the debt? Finally,
lenders often prefer to have the prirnary obligor be the primary debtor. These
types of considerations often mean that the parties cannot avoid a loan being
made directly to the corporation.

82Grojean v. Commissioner, 248 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Uri v. Commissioner, 949
F.2d 371 (lOth Cir. 1991); Harris v. United States, 902 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990); Brown v.
Commissioner, 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983); Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206
(1988), affd, 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1989). Contra Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (lIth
Cir. 1985). The court in Se!fo held that debt-equity principles developed under subchapter C of
the Code could be used in determining whether a corporate debt guaranteed by a shareholder
could be characterized as a capital contribution. The case involved somewhat unusual facts in
that the loan was originally made to the taxpayer and then converted to corporate loans when
the taxpayer incorporated her business. The Eleventh Circuit ruled against the taxpayer in
Sleiman v. Commissioner, 187 F.3d 1352 (I lth Cir. 1999). which involved more traditional
facts (original loan to corporation. guaranteed by shareholders). The Sleiman court did not
overrule Selft, however, and indeed seem to confirm its holding.
For an example of how sloppy paperwork can be fatal see Bolding v. Commissioner. 70
T.C.M. (CCH) 110, 1995 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 95.326 (A shareholder obtained a line of credit
from a bank. Funds were disbursed from the line of credit directly to the S corporation at the
shareholders direction. The Court held that the funds did not constitute a contribution to the
equity of the corporation because. based on the taxpayer's testimony, the funds were included
on the corporation's balance sheet as "Loans from Shareholders." The Tax Court. however, did
not treat the funds as an indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder either. because
the court could not determine that the funds borrowed from the bank constituted part of the
balance of the "Loans from Shareholders." The loans from the shareholder were not evidenced
by promissory notes or clear book entries.).
83I.R.C. § 1366(d).
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4. Section 754 Election
Another substantial advantage of the partnership over the S corporation is
the availability of the "section 754 election." Among the times a section 754
election can be useful is when a partnership interest is purchased or inherited.
If an election is made, the "inside basis" of the purchasing or inheriting partner's share of partnership assets is increased or decreased to equal the outside
basis of that partner's partnership interest. 84 If the inside basis of a partner's
share of partnership assets is "stepped up" as a result of the election, when
the relevant assets of the partnership are sold, the purchasing or inheriting
partner does not recognize gain to the extent of pre-acquisition appreciation.
The partner also is able to use the higher inside basis for computing depreciation and other relevant deductions. 85 What is good for the goose is good for
the gander, and a section 754 election can result in a downward adjustment
at the time the purchasing or inheriting partner acquires an interest, the
assets of the partnership have a fair market value that is less than their bases. 86
If a partnership has partners regularly coming and going, section 754 elections can become a major accounting headache, though the computer age has
reduced the pain.
Generally, a section 754 election is just that, an election. Logically, one
would make the election if it tneans an upward adjustment and not make it
if it means a downward adjustment. Life is sometimes that good, but often
is not. Once an election is made, it cannot be undone without the consent
of the Service. 87 If the partnership makes the election when a partnership
interest is purchased when the good times are rolling, it is most likely stuck
with it if a partnership interest is again purchased when the good times are no
longer rolling. The Service will not permit an election to be revoked merely to
avoid a downward adjustment. 88 Further, a downward adjustment is mandatory if, at the time of the transfer of the partnership interest, the partnership's
adjusted basis in the partnership property exceeds by more than $250,000 the
fair market value of such property. 89
Comparable adjustments to inside partnership bases are also possible when
a partner recognizes a gain or loss on a partnership distribution to him. Again,
a downward adjustment can be required in some cases where a loss is recognized. 90

if:

84

1 am putting in very sitnple terms rules that are highly complex. See I.R.C. §§ 743. 754.
755; Reg. §§ 1.743-1 (b)-(d), 1.755-1.
85Reg. § 1.743-1(b)-(d), (j).
86See id.
87Reg. § 1.754-1(c).
88 Permission may be given if there has been a substantial change in the nature of the partnerships business, a substantial increase in the assets of the partnership, a change in the character of the partnership assets. or an increased frequency of retirernents or shifts of partnership
interests. See Reg. § 1.754-1 (c).
89LR.C. § 743(d).
9°I.R.C. §§ 734(b). 754, 755; Reg. § 1.743(b), (c).
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A section 754 election in many respects permits greater accuracy. When
a taxpayer purchases an interest in an entity, he is ultimately looking at the
value of the assets in that entity to determine what he should pay. Especially
for a pass-through entity, being able to harmonize inside and outside basis
ensures that the tax consequences of the investment mostly closely match the
economics of the invescment. For example, if the partner buys the partnership
interest when a given partnership asset is worch $100, and the partnership
sells the asset for $100, the partner has no economic gain or loss. Without a
section 754 election, however, the partner may be allocated tax gain or loss
if the partnership's basis in that asset is other than $100. For this reason,
among others. there have been suggestions that section 754 elections be ITlade
mandatory across the board. 91 Mandatory elections have been resisted in part
because of the greater complexity they add to the system, but may gain new
momentum if Subchapter S is repealed, permitting greater attention to be
focused on Subchapter K.
For all of its complexity, most tax advisors agree that the existence of the
section 754 election is a good thing, at least for their clients. No analog to
the section 754 election exists for an S corporation. Thus, upon buying or
inheriting stock in an S corporation, the stockholder takes a basis in the stock
equal to its fair market value as of the date of purchase or the decedenes date
of death. 92 He cannot adjust the inside basis of the S corporation's assets to
equal the possibly higher outside basis of the corporate stock. Upon a sale of
appreciated corporate assets, the shareholder is taxed on a proportionate share
of the income, notwithstanding the fact that this income might increase the
basis of his stock in excess of its fair ITlarket value. The shareholder might not
be able to take advantage of the loss inherent in the stock until the stock is
sold, which could be well into the future. Further, the shareholder's recognized
loss on the stock normally is a capital loss whereas the gain on the sale of the
relevant property may be ordinary income, resulting in a character distortion
in addition to a timing distortion. Finally, if a shareholder dies before disposing of the stock, he takes his losses with him. The loss disappears because his
heirs take a fair rn.arket value basis in the stock under section 1014.

5. Compensation for Services
Often some owners contribute the capital necessary to start the business, while
others perforITl the services that will hopefully make the business successful.
How should the service owners be compensated? Partners can hold two different types of partnership interests: A capital interest, entitling the recipient
to an interest in the underlying capital of the partnership, or a profits interest,
91 See GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRlSES
371-77 (1999) [hereinafter ALI Report); Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient
Transportation Equity Act of 2003, S. 1072, l08th Congo § 5683 (2003); Jurnpstart Our
Business Strength OOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Congo § 469 (2004).
92LR.C. §§ 1012, 1014(a). In the case ofinherited stock, the valuation date can sornetitnes
be later than the dare of death. See LR.C. § 10 14(a).
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entitling the recipient to share only in future profits of the partnership. The
two types of interest are typically taxed differently. The fair lllarket value of
a capital interest given in exchange for services is taxable to the recipient. 93
Rarely, however, is a capital interest exchanged for services, because, in effect,
the "money partners" would be giving a share of their contributions to the
service partner. It is more COflllllon for a service provider to receive a profits
interest. Currently, in most circumstances, a profits interest is not taxable on
receipt. 94 I say currently, because the Service has proposed, and may soon
finalize, regulations that at least technically will change this result. 95 These
Proposed Regulations provide that any partnership interest, profits or capital,
is property.96 Outside the partnership context, it is long established law that
the fair market value of property received in exchange for services is ordinary
income, and the Proposed Regulations seek to illlplelllent this rule fully in
the partnership context. 97 Under most circumstances, however, the Proposed
Regulations allow a partnership interest to be valued at its liquidation value. 98
If a true future profits interest is involved, its liquidation value is cotnmonly
zero as the future profits have not yet been earned and cannot reliably be predicted. Thus, while there is a lot of smoke, there is often not going to be much
fire. A service partner usually incurs no income on receipt of a profits interest
now, and will also usually incur no incotne if the Proposed Regulations are
finalized. Of course, when the partnership earns profits, the partner holding
a profits interest includes his distributive share of those partnership profits in
93I.R.C. § 83(a); Reg. § 1.721-1 (b)(l). Under section 83(a), the incidence of income is
deferred if the partnership interest is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
94Rev. Proc. 1993-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. If a person. acting as a partner or in anticipation
of becoming a parmer, provides services to or for the benefit of the partnership and receives a
profit interest in return, the Service will not treat this transaction as taxable provided:
1. the interest does not relate to a predictable stream of income;
2. the partner does not dispose of the interest within two years; or
3. the interest is not of a "publicly traded" limited partnership.
95 See Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(1), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (2005).
96See id.
97 See I.R.C. § 83(a); Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(e). 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (2005) (explicitly providing that "property" includes a partnership interest); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426 (1955); Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943); see also
New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Proposed Regs and Rev. Proc. on Partnership Equity
Trans.forred in Connection w#h the Performance ofServices. 109 TAX NOTES (TA) 1311 (2005);
Marty McMahon. Recognition ofGain by a Partnership Issuing an Equity Interest for Services: The
Proposed Regulations Get it Wrong, 109 TAX NOTES (TA) 1161 (2005).
98See Proposed Regulation section 1.83-3(1), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (2005), which provides
for a safe harbor for when liquidation value may be used. and the related Proposed Revenue
Procedure in Notice 2005-43, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1221. The Proposed Revenue Procedure provides that the safe harbor may be used when the partnership interest (including a profits interest) received is not (1) related to a substantially certain and predictable stream of income from
partnership assets. such as income from high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net lease,
(2) transferred in anticipation of a subsequent disposition. or (3) an interest in a publicly traded
partnership within the meaning of section 7704(b). See Notice 2005-43. 2005-24 I.R.B. 1221.
These are very similar to the rwes of Revenue Procedure 1993-27. 1993-24 I.R.B. 63.
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income under section 702.
While this Article is not the place to engage fully the "carried interest
debate," it should be noted that this advantage of partnerships has at times
engendered controversy. The service provider usually has the sam.e ordinary
income tax consequence in the partnership context that she has outside the
partnership context. 99 The service provider receiving nonpartnership property
for services has ordinary incorn.e equal to the fair market value of the property
received. The profits earned and allocated to the service provider-partner are
also ordinary income-well there is the rub; that is usually the case, but not
always. If the service provider is running a private equity fund, and the profits
generated by the fund are from the sale of, say, capital assets held for over one
year, the fund's profits consist of long term capital gains taxed at a 150/0 rate
rather than ordinary income taxed at (maximally) a 35% rate. 100 The fact that
fund managers may be compensated for their services with 15% rather than
350/0 dollars has caused more than a little consternation in Congress, and the
House passed a bill that would have changed this outcome, though it was
never ultimately enacted. 101 Whatever the result of the carried interest debate,
the underlying rule for profits interest is unlikely to be changed dramatically
outside the private equity fund arena, and indeed it is not readily changeable. The uncertainty of future profits usually means a future profits interest
is valued at zero. 102 Thus, overall, this advantage for partnerships likely has a
bright future.
In the S corporation universe, on the other hand, there is only one type
of ownership interest that can be given a service provider: stock. 103 The fair
market value of an unrestricted stock interest is incom.e to the recipient, no

99The timing of when the ordinary income is recognized can, however. be very different.
IOOSU I.R.C. § 1.
IOITo AInend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Extend Certain Expiring Provisions,
and for other Purposes, H.R. 3996, 110th Congo (2007); see Chris Sanchirico, Taxing Carry:
]he Problematic Analogy to «Sweat Equity.» 117 TAX NOTES (TA) 239 (2007); Michael L. Schler,
Taxing Partnership Profits Interests as Compensation Income. 119 TAX NOTES (TA) 829 (2008);
Michael S. Knoll, ]he Taxation ofPrivate EqUity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Efficts
of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 115. 117-18 (2008);
Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U .C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 323
(2007); David A. Weisbach, Professor Says Carried Interest Legislation Is Misguided, 2007 TAX
NOTES TODAY 505 (2007).
For earlier but still relevant articles see Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating
Service Partners, 48 TAX L. REv. 69 (1992) (in which Professor Gergen recommends treating
the compensatory allocations to a partner as ordinary salary income). For a trio of related
articles discussing this issue (the latter two commenting on the first and adding their perspective) see Laura E. Cunningham. Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services. 47 TAX L.
REv. 247 (I 992); W. Lesse Casdeberry, Commentary: Carnpbell-A Simpler Solution. 47 TAX L
REv. 277 (1992); and Leo L. Schmolka. Commentary Taxing Partnership Interests Exchangedfor
Services: Let DiarnondlCampbell Quietly Die, 47 TAX L. REv. 287 (1992).
l02See St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C, 9158. 53 A.F.T.R.2d 84-718.84-721 (C.D.
IlL 1983).
J03See LR.C. § 1361 (b)(l); see also Reg. § 1361-1.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 62, No.3

768

SECTION OF TAXATION

ifs, ands, or buts about it. 104 Note that the S corporation service provider is
given the equivalent of a partnership capital interest. If the S corporation is
liquidated the day after the service provider is given an unrestricted stock
interest, she receives a share of the S corporation's assets, even if they were
contributed by others. Thus, the unrestricted stock received always has current value, something that is not necessarily the case for a partnership profits
interest.

B. Advantages ofS Corporations over Partnerships
1. Background

Before beginning this discussion, I should mention an advantage that S corporations once had, but no longer do. Indeed, this advantage was so significant,
it might have alone justified keeping Subchapter S alive. Before the advent of
LLCs, S corporations were a good solution for the "Mom and Pop" business.
Pre-LLCs, the only way to give the business a liability shield and the benefits
of partnership taxation was to form a limited partnership with a corporate
general partner. Mom and Pop could have been the limited partners as well
as the officers and directors of the corporate general partners. But, this meant
that Mom and Pop had to manage two entities, and be careful not t:o engage
in m.anagefllent activities when they had their lifllited partner hat on; doing
otherwise could lead to personal liability. 105 Mom and Pop usually could not
be trusted to keep things straight so many advisors put them in an S corporation. It was a second best, but safer choice. 106 But now Morn and Pop can
use an LLC and have the benefits of partnership taxation, while operating
out of a single entity that in most states is less burdensome to keep straight
than a corporation. 107 Further, in these closely held entities, the complexities
of Subchapter K are mostly held in abeyance, so that the LLC also is a fairly
simple entity for tax purposes.I0 8
Numerous changes have been made to Subchapter S to make it Illore
appealing. As I noted above, it may now have up to 100 shareholders. Section
501 (c) (3) organizations, pension plans, and family trusts may now be shareholders. An S corporation can own a QSSS and own stock in C corporations. 109 But few are benefitted by these changes. Over 880/0 of S corporations

l04I.R.C. § 83(a) (stating that the incidence ofincome is deferred in the stock interest subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture).
105In the interim, the rules for limited partner participation have been liberalized in many
states. See UniE Ltd. P'ship Act § 303 (2001).
I06See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 17, , 1.01.
107S ee BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 17 , , 3.08.
108For example, special allocations may not be needed and section 754 elections are likely
rare. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78, 84-92.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
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have two or fewer shareholders~ almost always individuals. 11o These changes
thus benefit a sITlall number of S corporations. The 100 shareholder rule is
primarily valuable in S corporations where trusts own stock and an extended
faITl.ily is the beneficiary of the trusts. III
The advantages of partnerships, in contrast, benefit the "everyday" LLC as
well as the sophisticated model. MeITlbers of everyday LLCs make contributions of property to the LLC and receive distributions from it. These transactions are nonnally tax: free under sections 721 and 731. While perhaps not
a majority, a large nUITlber of LLCs make special allocations of income and
loss to its tnembers. Most entities, including everyday LLCs, have debt. Only
in a partnership-type vehicle, such as an LLC, is section 752(a) available to
permit owner-level bases to be increased by entity-level debt. Sales of ownership interests are cotnITlon for all types of businesses, and owners of even the
smallest business cannot avoid the grim reaper. Yet only a person buying or
inheriting a partnership interest can receive an inside basis adjusttnent if an
election under section 754 is in effect. Further, these considerations tend to
drive the choice of entity decision.
But all that said there are a few circutnstances when S corporations have
the upper hand, though of relatively less iITlportance and relatively few in
number. As I discuss in detail below, these advantages do not provide adequate justification for the entire S corporation edifice. Those advantages that
are legititnate should be incorporated into Subchapter K, those that are not
should be abandoned.

2. Corporate Pathways
Sotne of the advantages that an S corporation has over a partnership have
to do not with the S corporation taxation regiITle as such, but with the fact
that an S corporation is just that, a corporation. SOnletitnes it is good to be a
corporation. SOnle examples follow.
a. Going Public. While publicly traded partnerships and even publicly
traded LLCs exist, the overwheltning nlajority of publicly traded entities
are C corporations. 112 Thus. a business that wants to tnake a public offering
usually needs to find its way into a C corporation. This process is quite a
straightforward matter for an S corporation. An S corporation lTlay terminate
its S election with a tnajorhy vote of its shareholders.l13 Thereafter, it is a C

110 As of 2004. See INTERNAL REvENUE SERVICE. SOl TAX STATS - S CORPORATIONS, at tbI. 6
(2004) [hereinafter SOl TAX STATS]. available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil04coI120s06.
xIs (last visited Apr. 2. 2009).
III LR.C. § 1361 (c)(2)(B)(iii), (iv) (stating that family members can be treated as one shareholder. making the effective number of permitted shareholders theoretically vast); see I.RC. §
1361(c)(I)(A), (B); see also EUSTICE & KUNTZ, supra note 59.! 3.04; Schiff Harden, LLP, TAX
UPDATE (Oct. 22,2004), http://www.schiffhardin.com/binary/tax_l02204.pdf.
1I2BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 17, , 16.01.
1l3I.R.C. § 1362(d)(1)(b) (stating that a final S corporation return must be filed).
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corporation and the public offering of the stock can proceed. 114
For a partnership, matters are more complex. There are two main options. 115
In "Option One,>' the partnership contributes its assets to the corporation in
exchange for stock. The partnership then liquidates and distributes the stock
to its partners. In "Option Two," the partners contribute their partnership
interests to the corporation in exchange for stock, liquidating the partnership as a matter of law, because a single owner-to wit, the corporationrernains. 116
The potential problem lies not with the liquidation of the partnership, but
with the incorporation. The liquidation of the partnership is typically, and
usually straight forwardly, tax free under sections 731. The incorporation
will be tax free to the corporation under section 1032, but for it to be tax
free to the contributing shareholders, it must fall within section 351 (a). As
I discussed above, section 351 (a) provides that a contribution of property to
a corporation is tax free if the contributing parties receive only stock in the
exchange and are in 80% control of the corporation "immediately after the
transfer." 117
Does section 351 (a) apply to Options One and Two? The critical issue is
whether the contributing shareholders have 80% control "immediately after"
the property is contributed in exchange for stock. In Option Two, the answer
is clearly yes as the stock goes directly to the partners. In Option One, where
the stock first goes to the partnership and then to the partners, the concern
is whether the partnership's ownership of the stock is so transitory that it
prevents the section 351 (a) requirements from being rnet. In Revenue Ruling
114Corporations do not recognize gain or loss on the receipt of property in exchange for
stock. LR C. § 1032. If the purchasers buying the stock pay with cash, as is typical, there is no
gain or loss to them either. Thus. section 351 is not needed. See Benjamin G. Wells. Planning
for rhe Special Tax Problems 1hat Arise in Taking an S Corporation Public. 80 J. TAX'N 164
(1994); see also Victor Fleischer, Rational Exuberance of Structuring l-i-nture Capital Start-ups.
57 TAX L. REv. 137 (2003); Daniel S. Goldberg. Choice ofEntity for a venture Capital Start-Up:
The Myth ofIncorporation, 55 TAX LAw. 923 (2002); Joseph Bankman, Structure ofSilicon Valley
Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1737 (1994).
115 A third approach is for the partnership to liquidate and distribute its assets to the partners, who could then contribute them t:o the corporation. The mechanics of this approach
are more problematic. Two sets of state transfer taxes could apply, for example, one on the
partnership's distribution to the shareholders and another on the partners' contribution to
the corporation. Further, if there is an actual or deemed distribution of money to a partner in
excess of his basis in his partnership interest, he would have to recognize gain under section
731(a)(l) to the extent of the excess. In addition, if the transfers to the corporation were not
done contemporaneously with the liquidation of the partnership (admittedly quite unlikely),
there would be the risk that a given partner might not be willing to contribute a particular
property, or might: have sold it, etc. Even if these problems did not exist. it is hard so see why
one would not prefer Options One or Two.
116Unif. P'Ship Act § 101 (6) (1997) (defining a partnership as an association of two or more
persons).
117Section 368(c) defines control to mean ownership of stock possessing at least 800/0 of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.
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1984-111, however, the Service ruled that where, as in Option One, there is a
contribution of property by the partnership to the corporation followed by a
liquidation of the partnership, the requirements of section 3S 1 (a) are met. I IS
In effect, the Ruling ignores the fact that the partnership's ownership of the
stock is brief
Does the answer change if a public offering follows the incorporation?
Revenue Ruling 1984-111 does not address this question. The issue is whether
the shareholders obtaining stock from the public offering have to be counted
for purposes of the 800/0 control test, and if so, when they are counted. If the
contribution to the corporation by the partners or the partnership is treated
as fully separate from the public offering, rhere is no problem because there
is 1000/0 control immediately after the original formation of the corporation.
If the contributions to the corporation by rhe partners or the partnership
and the contributions by the participanrs in rhe public offering are treated
as a single transaction, there is still no problem because the contributors also
have 1000/0 control immediately after the contribution. However, if section
3S 1 defines the control group as both the partners or the partnership and
the public purchasers~ and if the partners or partnership are considered to
make their contributions at different tiInes, section 3S 1 does not apply to any
contributor. 119
To complicate this complex situation further, there are two possible scenarios. One is where, prior to incorporation, the partners and the partnership have no agreement with an underwriter to make a public offering of the
stock. The other scenario is just the opposite, where the partners do have that
agreement. Typically, the partners will prefer the latter scenario. Once incorporated as a C corporation, the corporation and the owners may have to incur
two levels of taxation to get back to a partnership. 120 Thus, if the primary reason for incorporating is to go public, the partners want to be sure the public
offering is going to happen before tripping the incorporation domino.
See Rev. Rul. 1984-111. 1984-2 C.B. 88 (revoking Rev. RuL 1970-239. 1970 C.B. 74.
which carne to the same conclusion with regard to the section 351(a) issue). Revenue Ruling
1970-239 held that the tax consequences of all three scenarios were the sarn.e. Revenue Ruling
1984-111 revokes that holding. concluding that the tax consequences of the different options
can vary. Assuming § 351 (a) applies. then in the case of Option One, the partnership takes
the same basis in the stock that it had in the contributed property under § 358(a). Then the
partnership liquidation rules kick in. Generally. the distributee partners will allocate their bases
in the partnership interest to the Stock. See I.R.C. § 732. In the case of Option Two, under
§ 358(a). the erstwhile partners take as their bases in the stock. the bases they had in the
contributed partnership interests. I should perhaps note that there is no question here that the
parties are contributing "property" to the corporation. one of the requirements of § 351 (a).
Contributions of services will not generally count. See BrrrKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10,
,3.02(2].
119It would be highly unusual for less than 20% of the stock to be sold in a public offering.
Normally, participants in a public offering are contributing cash to the corporation. so for
them no gain recognition exists. Under section 1032, there is also no income to the corporation.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
11 8
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If the agree.ment is reached with the underwriter after incorporation, the
control test of section 351 (a) is most likely met. The contribution by the
partners or partnership is most likely seen as wholly separate from the public
offering. Current case law generally looks to whether there is a binding obligation made before incorporation by the shareholders to dispose of the stock. 121
If so, the stock that is the subject of that agreement cannot be counted toward
the 800/0 control test. If there is no such agreement, all of the stock that is
received can be counted toward the 800/0 test. The Tax Court summarizes the
law as follows:
A detennination of "ownership." as that term is used in section 368(c) and
for purposes of control under section 351, depends upon the obligations
and freedom of action of the transferee with respect to the stock when he
acquired it from the corporation. Such traditional ownership attributes as
legal title. voting rights, and possession of stock certificates are not conclusive. If the transferee, as part of the transaction by which the shares were
acquired, has irrevocably foregone or relinquished at that time the legal
right to determine whether to keep the shares, ownership in such shares is
lacking for purposes of section 35 L By contrast" if there are no restrictions
upon freedom of action at the time he acquired the shares. it is immaterial
how soon thereafter the transferee elects to dispose of his stock or whether
such disposition is in accord with a preconceived plan not amounting to a
binding obligation. 122
See, e.g.• Intermountain Lumber v. Commissioner, 65 TC. 1025, 1031-32 (1976).
122Id at 1031-32 (emphasis supplied); see BrCTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ,. 3.09[2]
(also containing this quote). It is sometimes also said that even without a binding obligation,
the taxpayer fails to comply with section 351 if the loss of concrol is both part of a preconceived plan and a sine qua not thereof BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ,. 3.09[2]. The
anti-taxpayer authority for this, however, is rather thin. There is one case, west Coast Marketing
Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 TC. 32 (1966), in which an exchange of the shares received in the
incorporation in a purported B reorganization was imminent, but no binding agreement to
make the exchange was in effect. The Tax Court held that section 351 (a) did not apply to the
incorporation, notwithstanding the lack of a binding agreement to exchange (he shares, in part
because the incorporation lacked a business purpose. Id. at 40. west Coast is inconsistent with
the Tax Court'S later holding in Intermountain. As both are Tax Court cases, the later holding
of Intermountain should be controlling. The other contrary authority is the hoary Revenue
Ruling 1954-96, 1954-1 C.B. 11 L which, of course, is not binding on the judiciary. Further,
the rrend of the Service's rulings is pro-taxpayer. Recently, the Service ruled that the section
351 (a) requirements were met even where there was a binding obligation to transfer the stock
received in the section 351 transaction, where there was an alternative tax free, section 351 (a)
way of structuring the transaction. See Rev. RuL 2003-51,2003-21 LR.B. 938. Finally, there is
some support in the Regulations for the Tax Court's holding in Intermountain. Reg. § 1.351l(a)(l) ("[I]mmediateo/ after the exchange does not necessarily require simultaneous exchanges
by two or more persons, but comprehends a situation where the rights of the parties have been
previouso/ defined and the execution of the agreement proceeds with an expedition consistent
with orderly procedure.") (emphasis supplied). The language about the rights of the parties
having been "previously defined" is consistent with the binding agreement approach. I found
no circuit court decisions inconsistent with the binding agreement test in the section 351
context. Indeed. the Tax Court cites a number of circuit courts in support of its decision in
Intermountain. See Intermountain Lumber, 65 TC. at 1032. That said, a given appel1ate court
121
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An obligation to dispose of stock could be interpreted to include new stock
to be issued by the corporation. But there is no such binding obligation to
issue additional stock if the agreement with the underwriter is made after
incorporation. Thus on incorporation of the partnership the requirements of
section 351 (a) should be met. It is conceivable a court could disagree with
the Tax Court's analysis, but that has not happened since the case carne out
in 1976, over 30 years ago.
And if there is such a binding obligation with the underwriter before
incorporation? The Service historically has taken a pro-taxpayer approach. 123
The Treasury and the Service solidified their views (if perhaps not the
clarity with which they were expressed) in Treasury Regulation section
1.3S1-1(a)(3) in 1996. It provides that if a person acquires stock from an
underwriter in exchange for cash in a qualified underwriting transaction,
that person is treated as transferring the cash directly to the corporation in
exchange for stock. 124 Further, the Regulations also provide that in determining whether the 800/0 test is met, siInultaneity is not required, "but corn.prehends a situation where the rights of the parties have been previously defined
and the execution of the agreement proceeds with an expedition consistent
with orderly procedure."125 Finally, the preamble to Treasury Regulation section 1.351-1 (a) (3) provides:
[A]lthough the regulations specifically concern underwriting. it is intended
that its principles could apply equally in factually analogous situations. For
example. if the ownership by other intermediaries in the distribution of
stock ... , such as broker-dealers, is transitory, that ownership should also
be disregarded. 126

Reading these provisions together along with Revenue Ruling 1984-111,
it seems clear that the incorporation of the partnership under either Option
One or Two, coupled with a public offering of the underlying stock, falls
within section 351 (a), even if there is a binding obligation to make the public
offering prior to incorporation. To summarize: (1) the transfers by the partners or the partnership to the corporation and the transfers of the ITloneys
to the corporation from the public offering do not need to be simultaneous,
(2) in Option One, the transience of the partnership's ownership is effectively ignored, and (3) the transfers from the public offering are deemed to
go directly to the corporation, even if the underwriter is a way station. Thus,
could apply the step transaction doctrine in a way that prevents section 351 (a) from applying
if there was a preconceived plan as suggested in BITrKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10, even if
there was no binding agreement. See also Ronald H. Jensen. OfForm and Substance: Tax-Free
Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REv. 349 (1991).
123See Rev. Rul. 1978-294. 1978-2 C.B. 141, superseded by Reg. § 1.351-1 (a)(3).
124 Reg. § 1.351-1 (a)(3). A qualified underwriting transaction is a transaction in which a
corporation issues stock for cash in an underwriting in which either the underwriter is an agent
of the corporation or the underwriter's ownership of the stock in transitory.
125 Reg. § 1.351-1 (a) (1 ).
126T.D. 8665. 1996-1 C.B. 35 (emphasis supplied).
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assum.ing the public offering occurs promptly after incorporation, both the
partner contributors and the public offering contributors should be seen as
part of one group, and, of course, that group has control of the corporation
once the sm.oke clears. 127 Thus, the taxpayers will not be denied the benefits
of section 351 (a).l2S
While there are few federal income tax hurdles to a partnership incorporating and making a public offering of the stock, there m.ay be state law hurdles.
State and local transfer taxes as well as transfer consents from m.ortgagors,
landlords, etc. could be issues for an incorporating partnership.129 Typically,
they are not issues on the conversion of an S corporation into a C corporation, because from a nontax: perspective there has been no change. The same
state law entity, to wit, the corporation, exists both before and after its conversion, subject to a different type of federal incom.e tax treatment.
The public offering arena is one in which the S corporation has som.e
advantages, though if there are few or no state law hurdles, the disadvantages
of the partnership form. are likely not substantial. Getting to the public offering frofll. a partnership form Inay involve more hassle than getting to it from
an S corporation form, but often the hassle is worth it. Much may depend on
how soon the public offering is planned (recalling that more businesses plan
to go public than actually go public). If tnany years m.ay go by between the
127 If there

is a dramatic delay in the public offering, and there was a pre-incorporation binding obligation to do the public offering. it could prove awkward. On the one hand, the binding
agreement makes it hard to ignore the public shareholders. on the other hand, a long delay
makes it harder to say there was control by the public and nonpublic shareholders "immediatelyafter" the exchange. I did not corne across a case on point, but the Regulations suggest
the Service would take a liberal approach. See Reg. § 1.351-1 (a) (I), (3).
128 See Goldberg, supra note 114, at 927-929. Those joys will be tempered. however, if the
liabilities of the partnership are greater than the partnership's bases in its contributed assets
(Option One), or if the liabilities allocated to partners are greater than the partners' bases
in their contributed partnership interests (Option Two). In that event. and to that extent,
gain will be recognized under section 357(c). Note that gain on incorporation will generally
be a consequence of prior deductions which reduced the bases of the assets and partnership
interests. Given the time value of money, the deductions will generally be more pleasurable
than the gains are painful. Section 357(c) trumps section 351(a), providing an exception to
the general rule of nonrecognition. LR.C. § 357(c). Gain must be recognized to the extent
the liabilities of a transferor exceed the transferor's basis in the contributed assets. I.R.C. §
375(c). Operating in parallel, section 752(b) would effectively allocate the gain among the
partners. LR.C. § 752(b). Section 752(b) provides that if a partner is relieved ofliabilities. that
is treated as a distribution of money to the partner. I.R.C. § 752(b) Section 731(a)(l) in turn
provides that if a distribution of money exceeds a partner's basis in her partnership interest,
gain is recognized. I.R.C. § 731 (a)(l). The gains may be ordinary or capital gains. The gain is
generally allocated among the assets based on their relative fair market values, and the character
of the gain is generally a function of the type of appreciated assets contributed. See Rev. Rul.
1968-55. 1968-1 C.B. 140. Some tax arbitrage is possible here. Depreciation on real estate
reduces ordinary income. where as the gain, if the property is held over one year, is long-term
capital gain taxed. generally, at a 25% rate up to the depreciation taken, and 15% thereafter.
See I.R.C. § l(h)(C), (D).
129See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 13-201 et seq. (LexisNexis 2007).
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original for.mation and the public offering, the tax advantages of a, partnership in the interim often outweigh the cumbersomeness of going public. On
the other hand, if a public offering is expected to occur in the near ter.m, a
partnership may not be worth the bother. An S corporation may make more
sense. It still permits the flow through of losses to the stockholders, provided
the stockholders have sufficient stock bases to allow for the deduction of the
10sses.130 Note that such "start-ups," particularly in the nanotech, biotech,
and information technology arenas, commonly operate at a loss for a nUlTlber
of years.
Venture capitalist funds commonly have a generic preference for the corporate form. While the use of an S corporation would permit a venture capital
fund to participate in losses, unlike the individual investor, its interest in tax
losses is often limited. When the venture capitalist fund invests in a company, its principal concern is the exit strategy. Usually this is a public offering, though, as I discuss below, it can also include an effort to position the
company for a takeover. If the venture capital fund holds common stock. it
will want to be able to force the corporation to register the shares at the time
of the "initial public offering" or ~'IPO."
Often, however, the venture capital fund does not want comfllon stock at
the tilTle of investment (pre-IPO), but preferred stock that has preferential
liquidation and redemption rights, and possibly preferential dividends. If the
venture capital fund needs to receive preferred stock. the S corporation form
is unavailable because S corporations are only pennitted to have one class of
stoCk. 131 The venture capital fund usually also wants an ironclad right to convert this preferred stock into common, and have the right at the time of the
public offering to have that common stock registered.
If an LLC or other tax partnership is used instead of a corporation, the docUITIents are much Illore challenging t:o draft as the parties have to find a way to
obligate a yet-to-be-formed corporation to issue common stock, and register
that comlllon stock for public trading, on some sort of fixed conversion basis
with the Illembership units of the existing LLC. Further complicating matters
is the fact that in ITIany cases there is not sifllply one venture capital financing
round, but many. It is much easier to create a new series of preferred stock for
each financing round than create legally reliable series of special me.mbership
interests in LLCs. All this can m.ake LLCs not worth the trouble, particularly
when the venture capital funds are far .more interested in obtaining a big pay
day at the end of the road rather than near-term tax benefits. If the venture is
unsuccessful, venture capital funds can still receive a section 165 loss deduction on their investment. Indeed, some venture capital funds, when they find
a company that they really like that is currently an LLC, require that it be

130I.R.C. § 1366(d) (5 corporation shareholders are also allowed to deduct losses to the
extent of any debt owed them by the corporation).
l3tl.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). Differences in voting rights are pennitted. I.R.C. § 1361(C)
(4).
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converted over to a C corporation before they invest. 132
While I discuss ways below to smooth the conversion of LLCs and other
tax partnerships into corporations,. there are limits. LLCs and tax partnerships do not fit every business model. SometiInes only a corporation will do.
While the world can live without S corporations, it cannot live without the
corporate form altogether.
b. ESOPs. Qualified pension trusts and section 501 (c)(3) charitable organizations are permissible S corporation shareholders.133 Qualified pension
trusts and section 501 (c)(3) organizations are generally tax exempt. 134 I will
therefore call them tax-exempt organizations, though this descriptor is not
fully apt, as I will discuss below. An employee stock option plan (ESOP),. a
type of pension trust, provides a good example of the benefit of the corporate
fonn to this class of shareholders, and I will focus on ESOPs in this discussion. 135
To abbreviate in the extrem.e, an ESOP is a qualified pension plan that a
corporation adopts. 136 Among an ESOP's purposes is to give the corporation's
employees an equity interest in the corporation. The funds contributed to
the ESOP by the corporation are generally tax deductible. 137 The stock in the
corporation purchased by the ESOP is held in trust, and the corporation's
employees are beneficiaries of the trust. 138
ESOPs are often designed to be cooperative purchasers of the stock of owners of closely held corporations. 139 Assum.e a corporation has a single shareholder who is also the CEO. The CEO is ready to sell her interest, but cannot
obtain an offer for the stock she feels will pay her full value. Instead, she has
the corporation form an ESOP. She sells her stock at full value to the ESOP.
Com.filonly, the ESOP borrows the money for the purchase from a bank. 140
The corporation makes periodic, tax deductible contributions to the ESOP so

132The reader will note the complete absence of footnotes for the above discussion. There
apparently is little citable authority in this area. lowe my own understanding of this area to
conversations with Professor Sean M. O'Connor of the University of Washington School of
Law, an expert in the venture capital arena.
133LR.C. § 1361 (b) (l)(B), (c) (6); see also I.RC. § 401(a).
B41.RC. § 50I(a).
135 Another reason for the coverage: I have been told informally, that in Congressional circles, some are defending S corporations due to their value to ESOPs.
136A "qualified" pLan is one to which contributions within certain limits are generally deductible and the income of which is generally tax exempt. These are subject to rules that liITlit discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees. See I.RC. §§ 401 (a), 404, 501(a).
137 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(3). (a)(9)(A).
138See LR.C. §§ 401. 4975(e)(7); see also Uses ofESOPs, 354 TAX MNGT. PORT. (BNA) A-I,
-2 (2005) [hereinafter BNA]. In the words of Senator Long: E50Ps will "ensure that tomorrow's free enterprise system is financed so as to be more broadly owned." 129 Congo Rec.
533,822 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long).
139The following is based on a conversation I had with Henry Smith. a pension plan expert.
See also BNA, supra note 138. at A-I.
14°See I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3).
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that the ESOP can rnake payments on its indebtedness with the bank. 141 As
these contributions are rnade, the corporation's ernployees are given equitable
interests in the stock held by the ESOp' 142 If an employee retires. the ESOP
is obligated to buy back his interest in the stock for fair market value unless
it is traded on an established exchange. though the employee can demand to
be given t:he stoCk. 143 If it works, ESOPs can be a win-win-win situation. The
business owner receives full value for her business. As the contributions to
the ESOP are tax deductible, the debt payment:s can be made, in effect, with
pretax dollars. And the employees are provided with pension benefits and a
participation in t:he business. 144
ESOPs are not all that common for two reasons. First, it: can be difficult to
find a bank that will make the loan. Second, the funds for the ESOP's purchase of the stock ultirnately have to corne from the corporation, and often it
does not want to take on this financial burden. 14s
To prevent tax-exempt organizations frorn destroying the tax base, Congress
provides that "unrelated business taxable inco.me" (UBTI) is taxed to mefll
currently.146 UBTI is incorne from a trade or business that is regularly carried on and is substantially unrelated to the tax-exempt organization's exempt
functions. 147 Passive income, including dividends and gains on the sale of
stock. is generally not UBTI. 148 It is thus normally safe for a tax-exempt organization to own stock in a C corporation, since the tax-exempt earnings will
corne in the form of dividends and stock gains. 149 A tax-exempt organization's
share of the income of an S corporation, on the other hand, is UBTI. 150 (The
same is true for its share of income of a partnership. lSI) But, the Code would

141 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(3), (a)(9)(A).
142See LR.C. § 4975(e)(7).
143I.R.C. § 409(h). (0).
144 Of course, in the case of Enron, it was lose-lose-lose. See Martin A. Sullivan, ?he Flawed
Economics of ESOPs and Employee Stock Options, 95 TAX NOTES (TA) 149 (2002); see also
LR.C. § 401(a)(28), (a)(35) (diversification rules).
145While ESOPs are permissible S corporation shareholders, it may make more sense to convert the S corporation to a C corporation before the stock sale to the ESOP is consummated.
If the owner sells C corporation srock to the ESOp' she recognizes no gain to the extent she
invests the proceeds in other qualifying C corporation stock (typically publicly traded securities). See I.R.C. § 1042.
146I.R.C. §§ 511, 512. "The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is
directed is primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of ... organizations enable
them to use their profit tax free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only
with profits remaining after taxes." Rep. No. 2375. 8Ist Cong.• 2d Sess. 28, 1950-2 C.B. 483.
504.
147I.R.C. § 513; see St. Luke's Hos. ofKan. City v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 85 (1980);
Rev. Rul. 1985-109, 1985-2 C.B. 165.
148I.R.C. § 5I2(b)(l). (b)(5). Note that the business income ultimately responsible for the
dividends and stock gains is generally fully taxable.
149To avoid UBTI. the organization cannot control the corporation. I.RC. § 512(b)(13).
15°I.R.C. § 512(e)(l).
151 LR.C. § 512(c).
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not be the Code if the exception did not itself have an exception. And that is
the case here. If an ESOP is the shareholder of an S corporation, its share of
the incoITle of an S corporation is not UBTI. 152 There is no tax at any level on
an S corporation owned entirely by an ESOP, m.aking ESOPs an interesting
option for S corporations.
Can an ESOP systeITl be created for partnerships? While theoretically possible~ it would be very difficult and highly cotnplex to achieve in practice.
Unlike corporations, partners generally must keep capital accounts. Capital
accounts can he thought of as a measure of the econoll'lic value of a partnership interest, though at tiInes they can be a highly ill'lprecise m.easure. 153
Keeping capital accounts in proper form for ESOPs or their beneficiaries,
with the stock holdings changing and beneficiaries coming and going, would
be very challenging. The Service has issued proposed regulations on "regular"
options to buy partnership interests. 154 The American Bar Association Tax
Section made suggestions both before and after the Proposed Regulations
were issued. 155 While the reader will he happy to hear that detailing these
efforts is beyond the scope of this article, I will note that I participated in the
ABA's part of the process and watched a lot of very smart people destroy a
lot of brain cells trying to get to the right answer. Adapting ESOPs to partnerships is not necessary. The solution is straight-forward. Once the ESOP
becoITles appropriate, the partnership can incorporate. There should be no
binding agreement in effect to create the ESOP before incorporation, less the
stock being sold to the ESOP not be counted for purposes of the 800/0 control
test. 156 Such a binding agreement is typically not needed. A small number of
shareholders are usually in control and thus need not doubt that the corporation, once formed, will adopt the ESOP, which can then buy the stock.
c. Takeovers. S corporations, and C corporations for that matter, can be
popular if the business's owners want ultimately to be the target of a takeover
by a publicly held corporation. As noted above:> venture capital funds often

152I.R.C. § 512(e)(3).
153 A partner's capital account is increased by the money and fair market value of property
contributed by that partner as well as income and gain allocated to the partner. A partner's
capital account is decreased by the money and fair market value of property distributed to the
partner. allocations to the partner that are not deductible and not capitalized. and allocations
to the partner of loss and deduction. See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b). Capital accounts playa
vital role in the economic effect test of Regulation § 1.704-1 (b)(2)(ii). See ARTHUR B. WILLIS,
JOHN S. PENNELL, & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION,. 10.03 (6th ed. 1997)
[hereinafter WILLIS].
lS4See Prop. Reg. § 1.704-1,68 Fed. Reg. 2930 (2003); Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3, 70 Fed. Reg.
29,675 (2005).
lS5See ABA COInments in Response to Notice 2000-29. 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 45-19,
Oan. 30, 2002); ABA Comments in Response to Prop. Reg. 103580-02, 2003 TAX NOTES
TODAY 213-21 (Oct. 9. 2003); Karen Burke. Taxing Partnership Options, 100 TAX NOTES (TA)
1569 (2003); Walter Schwidetzky. The Proposed Regulations on Noncompensatory Options, A
Light at the End ofthe Tunnel. 21 J. TAX'N OF INY. 155 (2004).
156See supra text accompanying notes 122-123.
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have a takeover as their exit strategy. Section 368 smiles on takeover transactions. 1S7 For example> the merger of the target into the publicly held corporation can be tax free. ISS So can the exchange of the stock of the target for
voting stock of the publicly held corporation (a B reorganization).159 Thus,
the owners can convert an illiquid asset (stock of a closely held corporation)
into a liquid asset, without paying a tax charge. The stock received in the
publicly held corporation can eventually be sold (likely pieceITleal) in a public
ITlarket. 160
Can the taxpayer get to the same place starting with a partnership?
AssuITling a binding agreement with the publicly held corporation that will
acquire the stock is in place before incorporation, probably not. Here, unlike
the public offering scenario above, there are no helpful regulations to bail
out the taxpayer. Further, Revenue Ruling 1970-140,161 now getting a little
long in the tooth, under similar facts says the taxpayer fails section 351 (a). In
Revenue Ruling 1970-140, pursuant to a preexisting agreement, a taxpayer
incorporated a sole proprietorship and then purported to swap the stock he
receives on incorporation for the stock of a public corporation in a tax-free B
reorganization. 162 The Service concluded that the taxpayer's receipt of stock
on incorporation of the sole proprietorship was "transitory and without substance for tax purposes. . . ." The Service reasoned that the two steps, the
incorporation and the B reorganization, should be integrated, so that rather
than an incorporation and a B reorganization, the taxpayer is sitnply seen as
contributing property to the public corporation. This means that the 800/0
control test of section 351 has to be applied with regard to the public corporation. The taxpayer, of course, does not ITleet the 800/0 control test under
these circumstances, and thus the gain or loss inherent in the contributed
property is not sheltered by section 351 (a). As restructured, there is a full
taxable exchange of the taxpayer's property for the stock in the public corporation. 163
More recently, the Service in Revenue Ruling 2003-51 both affir01ed and
distinguished Revenue Ruling 1970-140, and surprisingly concluded that the
157 See LR.C. § 368; BITTKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10. ,
12. Gain is recognized to the
extent "boot" is received; in this context. boot is money and property other than qualifjring
stock.
158I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A). Gain is recognized (and sometimes dividend income is earned) to
the extent of cash received. LR.C. § 356. Basis of shares received is determined under Code
section 358, a process which accounts for the cash received as well as the recognized gain and
dividend income.
159LR.C. § 368(a)(I)(B).
161JSee 17 C.ER. § 230.145 (2008).
161 Rev. RuL 1970-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73. Here the taxpayer started with a sole proprietorship
instead of a corporation, but the principle is the same.
1621.R.C. § 368 (a)(l)(B); Rev. Rul. 1970-140,1970-1 C.B. 73. I simplify the facts. Actually,
the taxpayer transferred the assets of the sole proprietorship to an existing corporation wholly
owned by the taxpayer. Rev. Rul. 1970-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73.
163There is no tax consequence to the public corporation. I.R.C. § 1032.
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control test of section 351 (a) was m.et, notwithstanding a pre-incorporation
binding agreement to dispose of the stock, if the taxpayer could have gotten to
the same end result tax free using a different series of steps. 164 In the takeover
transactions I posited above~ that would not be possible. However, Revenue
Ruling 2003-51 tantalizingly suggests that section 351 (a) could apply to the
first step in the takeover transactions I described above.
Treating a transfer of property that is followed by a nontaxable disposition
of the stock received as a transfer described in I.R.C. § 351 is not necessarily
inconsistent with the purposes ofI.R.C. § 351.165

Taken alone, this language fllight suggest that incorporating a partnership
and having the resulting corporation engage in, for exam.ple, a B reorganization
passes muster, notwithstanding the existence of a pre-incorporation
binding agreement for the reorganization. The problem is that the quoted
language cannot be read in isolation. Revenue Ruling 1970-140 involved
an incorporation followed by a previously agreed upon B reorganization.
Revenue Ruling 2003-21 does not revoke Revenue Ruling 1970-140.
Accordingly, the quoted language is either (1) the result of sloppy drafting,
or (2) an indication of where the Service wants to go, though it does not have
the intestinal fortitude to go there yet. 166
There are no cases contrary to Revenue Ruling 1970-140. 167 Therefore,
owners of a partnership wanting to be the target of a takeover and wanting to
have a binding agreement for the takeover before incorporation either have to
live with taxable gain on incorporation (i.e. usually be, from a tax perspective,
suicidal), or be willing to take their chances that Revenue Ruling 1970-140
no longer represents the Service's position. If, on the other hand, there is no
binding agreement for the takeover before incorporation, the incorporation
should be able to fall within section 351 (a). Depending on how literally the
Service and the courts apply the binding agreement test, a partnership may be
able to make substantial progress toward negotiating the takeover, and then
bring it to closure after incorporation. Having the takeover agreement fully
prepared and then simply signing it after incorporation might be pushing the
binding agreefllent test past the breaking point. The partnership and its partners could not be confident with facts that extreme that the courts will stay
164ReV. Rul. 2003-51,2003-1 C.B. 938.
165

Id.

166While I follow the Service's lead in focusing on section 35 L mere is also a substance-overform or step transaction argument, or both, that the taxpayer in Revenue Ruling 1970-140
did not engage in a valid B reorganization. The argument would be that. at essence, what was
involved was a swap of assets for stock in the public corporation rather than stock for stock as
required by section 368(a)(l)(B). See BI'rTKER IX EUSTICE, supra note 10, ! 12.04. The solution I propose would effectively address this issue as well. See infra text accompanying notes
175-186.
167Indeed, one case is consistent with Revenue Ruling 1970-140. See W. Coast Mktg. Corp.
v. Commissioner. 46 T.C. 32 (1966). As discussed supra note 122, west Coast is of dubious
authority.
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with the literal language of the binding agreement test as enunciated by the
Tax Court. Of course, as noted above, life is m.uch simpler if the owners start
with an S corporation. The incorporation of the S corporation will almost
always be old and cold before the section 368 reorganization happens.
d. Section 1244. A minor benefit for C and S corporations is section 1244.
It permits losses on the sale or exchange of corporate stock (normally a capital asset) to be treated as ordinary losses rather than capital 10sses. l68 Capital
losses are deductible from capital gains. In addition, individuals may deduct
up to $3,000 of any excess of capital losses over capital gains from ordinary
income. 169 Ordinary losses are generally fully deductible, subject to the at-risk
rules of section 465 and the passive loss rules of section 469. However, the
aggregate amount that can be treated as an ordinary loss under section 1244
is not huge, $50,000 per year for an individual, $100,000 for a husband
and wife filing jointly.170 Section 1244 also only applies to stock issued by
a corporation that qualifies as a small business corporation at the time the
stock was issued. A small business corporation is one with no more than $1
million of capitalization. I7l Finally, section 1244 tends to be less valuable for
S corporations than C corporations, as losses flow through to the shareholders
in an S corporation,l72 meaning that often there will not be much stock tax
basis left to generate losses on a sale or exchange. As partnerships also pennit
losses to flow through to partners,173 there is no crying need .. or indeed much
justification, for some kind of partnership tax analog to section 1244 in a
non-Subchapter S world.

3. Smoothing the Corporate Pathways
Serious problems with partnership incorporations currently exist prifllarily
when the incorporations are followed by some form of section 368 (a) reorganization. I discuss the justification for permitting incorporations to be followed by reorganizations in more detail below, but before I discuss the "why"
of it, I will discuss the "how" of it.
lt is at least theoretically possible for the Code to permit partnerships to
engage in tax-favored reorganization transactions with corporations directly.
But that would require penning a parallel reorganization system. The current corporate system is of long standing and incorporates substantial antiabuse provisions. I74 Rather than create a parallel system, it is simpler and
more elegant to amend section 351 (a) to provide that its control test is met
even if the incorporation is followed by a section 368 reorganization or other
tax-favored transaction, whether or not there is a binding agreement to enter
J68I.R.C.
169I.R.C.
17°I.R.C.
171I.R.C.

§ 1244(a).
§ 1211(b).
§ 1244(b).
§ 1244(c)(1)(A). (c)(3)(A).
172See supra text accompanying notes 36-45.
173See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
174See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, , 12.21.
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into the subsequent transaction at the time of incorporation. 175 This approach
tneans that taxpayers will have to go through the inconvenience of forflling an
often transitory C corporation, but the burden on the taxpayers is small when
cOlTlpared to the burden to the tax systetn generally if a parallel reorganization
system is created.
Additionally, the section 368 reorganization provisions should be amended
to make clear that they apply even if the participating corporation has recently
incorporated. This amendment is necessary to deal with an attack from the
other end of the transaction. While the focus to date has been on section
351, there also could be an arguInent, for example, that the B reorganization
stock-for-stock swap rules are not met if the stock comes from a recently
incorporated partnership. The Service could argue the flip side of Revenue
Ruling 1970-140,that in substance the acquiring corporation is not swapping
its stock for stock, but its stock for assets.
But the statutory change should go further. Incorporations followed by
public offerings and ESOP-type structures appear to be safe now, but the
authority for the current treatInent could be stronger. The binding agreement
test, for exatnple, comes out of the Tax Court. Judges on other courts can
disagree or the Tax Court can change its mind, or both. A Inore hard-wired
set of rules to help integrate Subchapters Sand K is preferable. The rules of
Revenue Ruling 1984-111, the current regulatory rules for public offerings,
.and the binding agreetnent test should be made statutory, except that, as
noted above, section 351 (a) applies even if there is a binding agreement to
engage in a reorganization transaction after incorporation.
One might ask why not pertnit an unrestricted tax-free incorporation. with
no limits on what the taxpayer can do with the stock after incorporation. But,
as I discuss in tnore detail below, section 351 provides tax-favored treatment
because the taxpayer is, essentially, continuing his investment in a different
fortn. If all or most of the stock is presold, what is really taking place is a sale of
the incorporated assets and not a bona fide conversion to the corporate form.
Pre-incorporation binding agreefllents that provide that after incorporation
there will be public offerings or corporate reorganizations are inoffensive as
the assets stay in corporate solution. But if the substance of the agreement is
a sale of the assets, the substance should control. Of course, SOflle taxpayers
Inay negotiate the sale of the stock, then incorporate, and then profllpcly sell
175 1

would include «divisive reorganizations" under section 355 within this rule. See BrITKER
supra note 10. , 11. Revenue Ruling 1970-140 actually applied a contribution of
property to an existing corporation followed by a B reorganization. This too should qualify
under an amended section 351 (a).
H.R. 4137. discussed infra at notes 291 to 308. took a filore lifilited approach. and would
have amended section 351 to provide that the step transaction and sifililar doctrines do not
apply for purposes of deterfilining the section 351 control requirefilent in any case in which
a partnership that is actively engaged in a trade or business transfers substantially all of its
property to a nonpublicly traded corporation. if that corporation then enters into a reorganization.
&

EUSTICE.
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the stock. But that problem exists under current law and the current law rules
of substance over form remain available to address the problem.
As to the "why" of allowing partnership incorporations to be immediately followed by reorganization transactions: Courts have noted that section
351 is intended to apply where "there has been a mere change in the form
of ownership."176 The taxpayer has not truly "cashed in on the theoretical
gain ...."177 Similarly, the legislative history to the predecessor of section 351
notes that the legislation provides new rules for "those exchanges or trades'
in which, although, a technical 'gain' may be realized under the present law,
the taxpayer actually realizes no cash profit.'''178 This continuity of investment
principle also applies in the section 368 reorganization context. 179 Partners
who incorporate a partnership and then engage in a section 368 reorganization have not, it can be defensibly argued, "cashed in on their theoretical
gainn either. The question, in other words, is if a section 351 (a) transaction
can be tax favored and a section 368 reorganization can be tax favored,180 why
not pennit the two to happen in quick succession and be tax favored?
In other contexts, the Code permits taxpayers to string tax-favored transactions together. There is no limit on the nUOlber of section 351 transactions,
section 721 transactions, section 368 reorganizations, and like-kind exchanges
under section 1031 that a taxpayer can do. Partners can form partnerships
tax free and liquidate partnerships tax free as often as they want. The better,
or at least Inore precise, question is not how many tax-favored transactions
can be strung together, but does each Code section allowing a tax-favored
transaction Olake sense on its own terms. To the extent it does, the fact that
a taxpayer can engage in several tax-favored transactions in a row need not
be offensive. For the two sets of Code provisions under discussion, section
351 and section 368, they indeed usually do make sense independently as the
taxpayer's investment is being continued, and thus allowing them to be done
in quick sequence is not inherently objectionable.
Does the analysis change if one goes FroIn holding a large illiqUid interest
in one entity to a small, liquid interest in a publicly held corporation? Here
one has not just changed the form of the investment; one has to a great extent
changed its fundamental nature. Yet that is currently allowed. One can merge
one's closely held corporation into a Fortune 500 company on a tax favored
basis,181 and Inergers are just one of several types of reorganizations in section
4:

176Stewart v. Commissioner. 714 F.2d 977. 987 (9th Cir. 1983).
177 Id.; see also Hernpt Bros. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172. 1177 (3d Cir. 1974).
178S. REp. No. 275, 11-12 (1921).
179See BrT'TKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10, ! 12.01 (lJ. There is an assumption that a section 355 transaction is. in fact. a type of reorganization; see Revenue Act of 1951. Pub. L. No.
82-183.65 Stat. 540; BrrTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ! 11.01 [1]. [2].
18°1 use the term "tax favored" instead of "tax free," as gain can be recognized. See LR.C.
§ 354.
181 See LRC. § 368(a)(1)(A).
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368 that permit this result. 182 If these transactions are to be permitted generally, and I see no prospect for this changing, they should be permitted for
partnerships that incorporate shortly before the section 368 reorganization.
Cooperation from the states is also required. As discussed earlier, in many
states, incorporating a state law partnership or LLC can pose major challenges. 183 Scate transfer taxes may apply, and consent by landlords and banks to
the transfer of assets may be required, etc. 184 What are needed are conversion
statutes. They already exist in many states. 185 Under such a statute, a state law
partnership or LLC can convert into a state law corporation while being considered the same entity for scate law purposes. This will avoid asset transfer
Issues.
Where the intention is to take the business of the LLC public, an alternative solution to the state-level problem would be to persuade the market to
accept publicly traded LLCs. Then no state law conversion would be needed.
The LLC-partnership could convert for tax purposes to an LLC-corporation.
Revenue Ruling 1984-111 or its statutory equivalent would need to be
amended to make clear which of the "Options" would apply on such a conversion, but generally the transaction should be tax free. 186 Publicly traded
LLCs already exist. The difficulty with this approach is the market for publicly traded securities is accustomed to dealing with C corporations as an
overarching entity. As noted in the venture capital discussion above,187 the
tnarket is also accustomed to dealing with, and often prefers, C corporation
ownership structures, including its classes of common and preferred stock.
There will thus likely be resistance to the large-scale use of publicly traded
LLCs.188 Perhaps LLC statutes could be amended to permit owners to hold
"C~llltnon and preferred stock," but at that point it m.akes as much sense to
si.luply have a state conversion statute.

4. The Capital Gain Freeze
Another advantage of an S corporation over a partnership is the so-called
capital gain freeze technique. This normally presupposes a taxpayer who owns
real estate that is a capital asset 189 with substantial, inherent long-term capital
gains. If the property is sold before development, these gains are taxed at

S ee I.R.C. § 368(a)(l); BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ! 12.
ee supra text accolllpanying note 129.
184See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 13-201 et seq. (LexisNexis 2007).
185 See BISHOP & Ki.EINBERGER, supra note 17. , 12.14.
186See supra text accolllpanying notes 115-18.
187 See supra text accolllpanying notes 129-31.
188See Fleischer, supra note 114. at 137; Goldberg. supra note 114, at 943.
1891t is also possible for the property to be a section 1231 asset, which includes real property
used in a trade or business. If a taxpayer's gains frolll section 1231 assetS exceed his losses from
those assets, all the gains and all the losses are generally characterized as long terlll capital gains
and losses. I.R.C. § 1231. It is probably lTIore common for the property to be a capital asset
before it is developed.
18

2
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favorable rates. In the case of raw land, for example, the rate is 15 % • 190 If
instead, the taxpayer subdivides and develops the land, selling the lots individually, all of the gain on the sales is ordinary income, including the gain
inherent in the property before development. Property held for sale in the
ordinary course of a trade or business does not qualify as a capital asset, even
it was a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer previously. 191
There is currently a solution to this unhappy state of affairs. Before development, the taxpayer can sell the property to an S corporation the taxpayer controls. The S corporation then develops and sells the lots. The S corporation's
gain on the sale of the lots is ordinary income, but the predevelopment gain
is locked in as long term capital gain to the taxpayer by dint of the taxable
sale to the S corporation. 192 The S corporation takes a fair market value basis
in the property upon purchase. 193 It is very unlikely that the S corporation
can be funded with sufficient cash to be able to pay for the property outright.
Most likely the S corporation pays with promissory notes that are payable
in the future as the S corporation collects revenues from the sale of the lots.
Under the installment sale rules of section 453, normally the selling taxpayer
only has to recognize his long-term capital gain as the notes are paid. 194 A
heavily indebted corporation with a high debt to equity ratio sometillles has
to worry about the debt being reclassified as equity. 195 This is not generally a
problelll in the S corporation context, however, as long as the debt meets the
"straight debt safe harbor."196
The taxpayer cannot achieve this result by selling the property to a partnership. Section 707(b)(2) treats a partner's gain as ordinary income if the
partner sells property to a partnership which in the hands of the partnership
is not a capital asset, and the partner directly or indirectly owns more than
500/0 of the capital or profits interest in the partnership. 197 The selling partner,
perhaps with other related parties, normally controls the partnership, and the
property in the hands of the partnership is not a capital asset as the partner-

19°I.R.C. § l(h)(l)(C).
191 See l.R.C. § 1221(a)(l); Mauldin v. Commissioner. 195 F.2d 714, 715 (lOth Cir. 1952).
Section 1237 contains a minor exception. I.R.C. § 1237.
192LR.C. § 100I(c).
193LR.C. § 1012.
1945ee I.RC. § 453(e) (explaining limitations that do not usually pose problems).
195 See BrrTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10. , 4.02.
1965ee LRC. § 1361(c)(5). The debt must be sum certain payable on demand or on a specified date, the interest rate cannot be contingent on profits or the borrower's discretion, the debt
cannot be convertible into stock, and the creditor must be an individual, an estate or trust that
is qualified to be an S corporation shareholder, or a professional lender.
197The constructive ownership rules of section 267 apply for purposes of determining
whether a partner meets the ownership test. These rules would, for example, attribute partnership interests owned by certain family members to the selling partners. See I.RC. § 707(b)
(3).
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ship uses it in the business of developm.ent. 198 Section 707(b)(2) is generally
said to be designed to prevent tax arbitrage. The sale gives the partnership a
fair market value basis in the property. The likely cost to the related partner
seller is long term capital gains likely taxed at low rates. Further, the partnership can now depreciate the property from the new, higher basis. 199 At times,
the tax benefits of the higher basis to the partnership offsets the tax cost to the
related selling partner. The risk of tax arbitrage is highly unlikely when the sale
is of real property. The depreciation rates for improvements to real property
are quite long, 27Y2 years for residential property and 39 years for commercial
property.200 Usually, only a mathematically-challenged panner accepts the tax
burden of the sale gain today in exchange for a series of relatively small annual
depreciation supplements to the partnership for many years in the future.
Further, the real property involved in capital gain freezes probably is most
often raw land, which is not depreciable at all. If the sale is of an apartment
building which the parties want to convert to condominiums, the gain equal
to depreciation previously taken is typically taxed at a fairly high rate, 25%,
making the tax arbitrage more uneconom.ical and more unlikely. 201
It is not apparent why existing, inherent capital gains should be converted
to ordinary income when the use of the property changes. It is appropriate for
future appreciation to be taxed in a manner that is consistent with the nature
of the new use, but not past appreciation. This raises the question of whether
an overarching solution should he found that would apply across the board
and not just in the partnership context. 202 That is worth considering, though
it is beyond the scope of this Article.
To bring some rationality to subchapter K in this regard and further
integrate Subchapters S and K, at a minifllum section 707(b)(2) should be
afllended to provide that it only applies to sales of personal property. Thus,
the capital gain freeze technique for real property could be implemented with
a partnership.
8

5 ee I.R.C. § 1221 (a)(2). The lots held for sale are also not capital assets. See LR.C.
§ 1221(a)(1).
1995ection 707(b)(2) overlaps with section 1239.
2°Ol.R.C. § 168(c).
201 See LR.C. § 167; Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41,46 (2d Cir. 1995); see also I.R.C.
§ 1 (h)(I)(D).
202Why require any long term capital gain that arose while property was held as an investment to be converted into ordinary income when the property is converted to a different
purpose? Why require taxpayers to go through the fiction of a sale? Well, in truth. there could
be practical problems. In the classroom, we can make our numbers up. but in the real world
it is hard to know with certainty what the value is at the rime property is converted to another
use. Also. how will the service know if property is truly being held for investment? The current
rule effectively requiring a sale to an S corporation (and under my proposal to a partnership)
has the advantage of setting a heralding, reportable event that the Service can audit and upon
which it can reach an independent judgment. Another possible solution that does not require
a sale is to require a minimum holding period for the property during the investment phase
where no significant development takes place. perhaps five years, with an appraisal to be done
at the time of conversion by an independendy licensed and unrelated appraiser.
19
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5. ?he Medicare Tax Dodge
Here I move from the defensible to the sometimes indefensible. 203
a. Some Background. Section 1401 imposes a tax on u net earning frofil self
employment" (NESE).204 The tax has two cOfilponents. One component is
for "old-age, survivors, and disability insurance," commonly known as the
Social Security.205 The tax is 12.40/0 ofNESE. The maximum NESE to which
it applies is $102,000 in 2008. 206 The other component is for "hospital insurance," comrnonly known as Medicare, and is 2.90/0 of NESE and applies to
all of a taxpayees NESE.207 There is no dollar limit. 208
NESE is defined as «gross income derived by an individual from any trade
or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions . . . attributable to such trade or business, plus his distributive share of income or
loss ... from any trade or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a
member . . . ."209 NESE does not include certain kinds of passive income.
including portfolio income, capital gain, and similar income (Excluded
Income).21o I will discuss this in more detail below, but note that in this definition all partnership income other than Excluded Income in NESE.
The Social Security and Medicare taxes apply differently to employers and
employees. They apply to "wages," that is, compensation to an employee for
services rendered. 211 The employer and the ernployee each pay one half of
the Social Security and Medicare taxes. The total tax is the same as it is for
the self-employed. Thus, the tax that the ernployer and employee each pay is
6.20/0 of wages for Social Security (up to the same $102,000 maximum that
applies to self employment income) and 1.45% of wages for Medicare (without a maximum).212
A partner cannot be an employee of a partnership or receive wages from.
a partnership for services rendered. 213 Outside of Excluded Income, a gen-

203«Indefensible" waS once also the name of Warren Buffet's private jet. It is now the "SemiDefensible."
204I.R.C. § 1401.
205I.R.C. § 1401(a).
206This amount is adjusted for inflation; see Notice 2007-92, 2007-47 I.R.B. 1036.
207I.RC. § 1401(b).
208IndividuaIs are entided to a trade or business deduction equal to one half of the selfemployment tax. I.RC. §§ 62(a)(1), 164(f).
209I.R.C. § 1402(a).
21°I.R.C. § 1402(a). Among the exclusions are certain rentals from real estate, most dividends, certain interest, and certain property gains (typically from the sale of capital assets).
See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(I). Certain retirement payments are also excluded. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)
(10).
2BThe statutory phrase is "remuneration from employment." See LR.C. § 3121 (a).
212See I.RC. §§ 3101, 3111; Notice 2007-92,2007-47 I.R.B. 1036. Notwithstanding this
division. there is evidence that employees bear the economic burden of the entire tax. They pay
their own share directly and, in effect, the employer's share through reduced wages. See HARVEY
ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 286 (7th ed. 2005).
213Rev. Rul. 1969-184. 1969-1 C.B. 256.
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eral partner's distributive share of incoIne is always NESE.214 NESE does not
include the distributive share of any limited partner other than guaranteed
paYITlents under section 707(c) for services rendered. 215 Note that a partner
can hold both a lim.ited and general partner interest, and section 1402(a)
applies to each separately. The lim.ited partner exception was added to prevent
passive investors from. obtaining Social Security coverage. Lim.ited partners
had originally been subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes to the sam.e
extent as general partners, but Congress was concerned that limited partnerships might be established as investment vehicles in order to obtain Social
Security coverage and excluded limited partners in the late 1970s. 216 Who
qualifies as a limited partner is not defined in the Code or Regulations, but it
appears from the legislative history and the plain language of the statute that
a state law limited partner is .rneant. 2t7 Thus, apparently all tax partners who
are not state law limited partners, including LLC meInbers, fall under the
general NESE rule. 218
To sum.rnarize, all income from a trade or business (other than Excluded
Inco.rne) of any partner (other than a limited partner) is NESE, regardless of
the partner's participation in the business, regardless of the capital invested
in the business, and regardless of the character of the business. It is thus very
possible for a partner (other than a lim.ited partner) to have NESE that is
unrelated to any services performed by the partner.
One might think that both wages and NESE would measure the sam.e
thing, income earned from the provision of services. The fact that this is not
the case has much to do with the history of the Social Security tax. The Social
Security tax structure was originally centered on the employer-employee relationship.219 In the early years, coverage extended only to lim.ited groups of
wage earners. 220 The self-employed were not covered. 221 Thus, originally it
was clear that the Social Security tax (the Medicare tax had not yet been
created)222 applied only to income from services. The self-em.ployed originally
resisted coverage, but then in the 1950s acquiesced partly due to the fact that
meaningful coverage could be had at what at the time was still a low rate of
2141.R..C. § 1402(a).
2151.R..C. § 1402(a)(13).
216 See Patricia E. Diller, Breaking the Glass Slipper-Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax.
54 TAX LAw. 65, 85 (2000).
217 See H.R. REp. No. 95-702 at 40, 1978-1 C.B. 469,477 (1977). At that time. only a state
law limited partnership could been meant as LLCs and similar entities did not yet exist. See
also David C. Culpepper et al., Self-employment Taxes and Passthrough Entities: Where Are We
Now. 109 TAX NOTES (TA) 211, 212 (2005). The Service might be authorized to expand that
definition. See infra text accompanying notes 230-238.
us See Culpepper. supra note 217.
219 See Diller. supra note 216, at 70.
22°Id.
2211d. at 71.
222 It was enacted in 1965. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79
Stat. 286.
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tax. 223 Congress had been concerned about the administrative feasibility of
including the self-employed within the Social Security system, particularly
with regard to obtaining accurate reports of their income. 224 These concerns
were eventually laid to rest and the self-employed were included, but nothing
in the legislative history suggests that Congress wanted the focus of the Social
Security tax to move from a tax on income from services to a tax on income
from services and capital. Further, at the thne the self-employed were brought
into the fold, m.uch of the discussion seems to have centered on applying the
Social Security tax to professionals such as doctors and lawyers, that is, service providers. 225 ThUS,. when Congress brought the self-employed within the
Social Security tax system, it likely thought that NESE primarily focused on
income from services. Further, by excluding certain passive income and later
income of limited panners (historically by definition passive participants),
Congress made some effort to exclude from NESE certain kinds of income
that are not from services.
Finally, there would have been little logic to expanding the Social Security
tax to include incoIne from capital. Why should the type of income subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes for employees be different than
that for the self-employed? Employers and employees are not being rewarded
for using double-tax C corporations, as S corporations, which also can have
employees, are subject to the SaIne employment tax rules as C corporations.
S corporations have been on the scene since 1958 and conceptually since
1946. 226 Further, the Social Security benefits one receives are a function of
what one pays in. 227 Why would Congress want the self-employed to have a
larger base for benefits than employees? Whatever Congress's intent, Social
Security and Medicare taxes should not apply to incoIne from capital.
b. TIme waits For No Congress. TiIne has passed section 1402 by. There
is not a lot of logic to its current structure in the current business universe.
While self-employment taxes should focus on income from services, in an
LLC universe NESE can, and often does, include much income that is from
capital. There is no good reason why passive owners who are limited partners are not subject to self-employment taxes and passive owners who are
LLC members are subject to self-employment taxes. Further, in an increasing
number of states lifllited partners have increasing rights to participate in the
affairs of the limited partnership,228 making their automatic exclusion froIn
NESE dubious. The logic behind these dichotomies has not been apparent to

ee Diller. supra note 216. at 71-74.
REp. No. 1669 (I950); see abo Yoder v. Harris. 650 F.2d 1170. 1173 (I Om Cir. 1981)
(discussing the relevant legislative history).
225 See Diller. supra note 216, at 71-74.
226pub. L
No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606 (1958); see RICHARD B. GOODE, THE POSTWAR
CORPORATION TAX STRUCTURE (Treas. Dep't 1946).
227 See Diller. supra note 216. at 70.
228S ee Unif. Ltd. P'Ship. Act § 303 (2001).
223S

224 S.
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the Service either. 229
In 1997, the Treasury proposed regulations in this area. This was one of
several efforts I will outline that attempt to limit NESE to income from services, or at least reduce the amount of income from capital that is included
in NESE. The Treasury faced a terminological challenge, in that it had to
squeeze its regulations into the statutory general-limited partner structure. It
did this by freeing the term "limited partner" in the tax statute from that term
in state law statutes. Under the Proposed Regulations, a member of any state
law entity that is classified as a partnership for federal income tax purposes
can be treated as a limited partner for section 1402 purposes under some circumstances. 230 The Proposed Regulations also partially address the overarching issue of when income is from services and when from capital.
The laudable objective of the Proposed Regulations is to insure that similarly situated individuals owning interests in entities formed under different statutes or in different jurisdictions are treated similarly.231 The Proposed
Regulations treat an individual as a limited partner unless the individual (1)
has personal liability for the debts of or claims against the partnership by
reason of being a partner; (2) has authority to contract on behalf of the partnership under the statute or law pursuant to which the partnership is organized; or (3) participates in the partnership's trade or business for more than
SOO hours during the taxable year. 232 Note that if a state law limited partner
meets one of the three criteria, he is not a limited partner for section 1402
purposes.
If an LLC is "member-managed," all members have the apparent authority
to contract on behalf of the LLC, irrespective of whether they hold multiple
classes of interests or not. 233 Consequently, no member of a member-managed LLC qualifies as a limited partner under the Proposed Regulations. On
the other hand, in a manager-managed LLC, the managers have the exclusive
authority to manage the LLC, and members who are not managers normally
do not have any apparent authority to contract. 234 Consequently, these nonmanaging members can qualify as limited partners as long as they do not fail
the SOO-hour test. By statute they have no general liability for the obligations
•

229 Som.e older private letter rulings treat a LLC lTIem.ber's share of incom.e as NESE. See,

e.g.• p.L.R. 1994-32-018 (May 6, 1994); P.L.R. 1994-52-024 (Sept. 29, 1994); P.L.R. 199525-058 (Mar. 28, 1995).
230Prop. Reg. § l.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997). These were preceded by Proposed
Regulation section 1. 1402(a)-18. 59 Fed. Reg. 67,253 (1994). which focused m.ore on LLCs,
as such.
231 See Prop. Reg. § l.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1702 (1997) (see "Background").
2321d. The 500-hour rule is derived from the regulatory definition of m.aterial participation
under the passive loss rules of section 469. See Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1).
233See BISHOP &: KLEINBERGER,. supra note 17,,7.02.
2341d.
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of the LLC; thus test {I} of the Proposed Regulations could not apply. 235
The Proposed Regulations contain a special rule for services partnerships,
under the assumption that virtually every one involved will be actively performing services. The Proposed Regulations provided that if substantially all
of the activities of a partnership involve the performance of services in the
fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science"
or consulting, any individual who provides such services for the partnership
cannot be classified as a limited partner, and thus all of his income is NESE
{other than Excluded Income}.236
The Proposed Regulations permit individuals to hold more than one class
of interest in any partnership except a services partnership. A partner may
bifurcate his interests, with some interests earning NESE, and other "limited
partnership interests" not earning NESE.237 Thus, the treatment that is available today in a state law limited partnership, the Proposed Regulations make
available to all nonservices tax partnerships.238 It is here that the Proposed
Regulations make an initial attempt to tussle with the issue of when income
is frorn. services and when from capital. In effect, the Proposed Regulations
are saying that for nonservices partnerships (irrespective of the state law classification) it is perrn.issible to create a class of limited partnership interests to
which non-NESE income can be allocated. This income can be viewed as
corning frorn. capital and not from services. While the Proposed Regulations
are hardly comprehensive, they take a step in the right direction.
The Proposed Regulations "Were generally well received,239 but Congress
imposed a rnoratoriulll, stating that they could not be finalized before July

235 A litnited liability partnership (LLP) is a general partnership with a liability shield. Thus.
its partners are general partners. and, in tnost states, have the authority to contract to the same
extent as general partners in general partnerships, and thus also would not have qualified as
litnited partners under the Proposed Regulations irrespective of whether they hold tnultiple
classes of interests or not. See Culpepper. supra note 217; see generally, BISHOP & I<LEINBERGE~
supra note 17. ,. 1.05.
236 Prop. Reg. § 1. 1402(a)-2(h)(5), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
237Under the Proposed Regulations, it is possible to qualify as a litnited partner even if the
partner participates over 500 hours and does not hold multiple classes of interest. For this rule
to apply, litnited partners (as normally defined under the Proposed Regulations) tnust own a
substantial, continuing interest in the partnership, and the rights and obligations of the individual in question tnust be identical to those for the limited partnership class. The underlying
presutnption apparently is that the partner would be paid for her services, and the rest of any
paytnent should be seen as return on capital. Note that the partnership would still have to have
two classes ofinterest overall. Prop. Reg. § 1.1402-2(h)(4).
238The Proposed Regulations, however, pertnit the bifurcation of interests only to the extent
the individual's rights and obligations with respect to a limited partnership class of interest is
identical to the rights and obligations of other partners in that class who (1) qualify as limited
partners under the Proposed Regulations without regard to the bifurcation rules, and (2) own
a substantial interest in the partnership. Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3), -(h)(4).
239 See John R. Marquis, Business Problems 6- Planning: Current Status of Limited Liability
Companies and the Self-Employment Income Tax. 77 MICH. B. J. 440, 441 (1998).
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1, 1998. 240 That date has come and gone without the Treasury taking any
additional action on the Proposed Regulations, though they have not been
withdrawn. Congress appears to have been concerned about the risk of existing state law limited partners being reclassified as other than limited partners
for federal income tax purposes. 241 In fact, this risk was quite slight as most
litnited partners doubtless fail all three tests. 242 Further, in those cases where
reclassification might happen, it is likely justified. Political pressure, not for
the first time, may have taken precedence over sound tax policy, and to date
the Treasury has not had the intestinal fortitude to take another run at it.
The difficulty with the Proposed Regulations is that they do not tackle the
income-from-capital versus income-from-services issue head-on. Curiously,
the Proposed Regulations provide backdoor endorsement of manager-managed LLCs, as they are the only unincorporated entity other than a state law
limited partnership that can effectively create two classes of interests. LLCs
are usually preferred to limited partnerships, as limited partnerships require
two entities to achieve a full liability shield;! the limited partnership itself
and a corporation or LLC as the general partner. 243 To muscle the nonservice
universe into these two entities-few would want to use C corporations-is
perhaps not the most sensible approach. On the other hand, the Service was
bound by the limitations of the statute it was interpreting. The only "out"
from NESE was the income allocated to a limited partner. Others have had
a freer hand.
In 1998, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
in response to the Proposed Regulations, suggested a statutory change. 244 In
broad outline, the AICPXs proposed amendment provides that partners in
tax partnerships have NESE to the extent of the reasonable value of the services performed on behalf of the partnership. It contains a safe harbor for
determining the reasonable value of services. If a partner's NESE varies from
the safe harbor by more than ten percent, the NESE is subject to "reason-

240 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 935, 111 Stat. 788, 882 (1997).
241 See Culpepper. supra note 217, at 222.
242Congress itself partially acknowledged the truth of this in 1997. When discussing the
passive loss rules, the Statement of Managers for the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 observes that
limited partners usually do not materially participate in a partnership's activities. H.R. Rep.
No. 105-220, at 662 (1997) (Con£ Rep.). reprinted in 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 148-32 (Aug. 1,
1997); see also Culpepper. supra note 217.
243In states that allow limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs) it may be possible to
get by with one entity. but only a minority of states allow for LLLPs, and most advisors will
insist on a corporation or LLC as a general partner if the LLLP is going to be doing business
in a non-LLLP jurisdiction. An LLLP is a limited partnership with a liability shield around the
entire partnership so that even the general partners have limited liability. See generally BISHOP
8<: KLEINBERGE~ supra note 17. ! 1.02.
244AICPA Forwards Legislative Proposal on Self-Employment Taxes. 98 TAX NOTES TODAY
39-34 (Feb. 27, 1998) [hereinafter AlCPA Proposa/j. The Small Business Tax Modification Act
of 2004. section 3. takes a similar approach co that of the AICPA (doubtless not by coincidence). See infra notes 281-300.
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ableness testing on the basis of facts and circumstances.
." The safe harbor
NESE is the partner's distributive share of partnership incoIne or loss plus
the section 707(c) guaranteed paYInent for services minus a reasonable rate
of return on the partner's capital account at the beginning of the year. The
rate of return on the partner's capital account is deeIned to be reasonable if
the rate used is 1500/0 of the applicable federal rate 245 (AFR) at the end of the
partnership's tax year.
The proposal has several shortcoInings. It does not except services partnerships, the Inost likely area of abuse, notwithstanding the fact that an objective
review of most service partnerships would conclude that all or almost all of
their income is NESE. What is worse, given the safe harbor, service partnerships have an incentive to inflate capital accounts to avoid NESE. This
could be done by Inaking cash contributions to the partnership and holding them. in a m.oney Inarket account. Further, capital accounts are usually
not precise measures of the value of partners' invested capital. 246 While they
n
can under SOIne circuInstances be "restated to current value, this is relatively
uncomm.on. 247 A partnees capital account may lag far behind or move far
ahead of the value of the partnees partnership interest. Thus, a reasonable rate
of return on the partner's capital account Inay yield a meaningless number.
Finally, while there is much to be said for bright, predicable lines, the 1500/0
AFR standard is arbitrary. For some industries the 1500/0 rate could be far
high or far low. 248 The AICPA provides for additional fudge room by permitting partners to vary from the safe harbor by ten percent. Of course, what the
AlCPA is likely trying to do is lim.it partners' NESE as much as practicable.
In 2005, the Joint Com.mittee of Taxation aCT) also proposed a statutory change. 249 This proposal eliITlinates the special rule for limited partners
and applies to all tax parmerships. All incom.e, including Excluded Income,
is NESE in the case of a partnership engaged in the perfonnance of services
in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture. accounting, actuarial
science, or consulting (professional services). For other partnerships, how
a partner is treated is a function of whether or not the partner "ITlaterially

245The Service sets short-term. mid-tenTI. and long-term applicable federal rates monthly.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-43. 2008-31 I.R.B. 258. Curiously, the AlCPA report does not specify
which of these three applicable federal rates it would use. See AICPA Proposal, supra note 244.
46
2 Under the Regulations, capital accounts must be increased for the fair market value of
contributed property (net of associated debt), money contributed, and allocable partnership
income. The capital accounts must be decreased for the fair market value of distributed property. money distributed, and partnership losses. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b).
247 See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f).
248 See Letter from George K. Yin, Acting Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation, to
Senators Charles E. Grassley and Max Baucus, at 34. (Aug. 3, 2006) [hereinafter JCT 2006],
available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/pressIGpressI2005/prgl 0 1906.pdf.
249 STAFF OF

J.

COMM. ON TAX'N. OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX

99 (2005), available at ht:rp:llwww.house.gov/jet/s-2-05.pdf. I do not discuss
their S corporadon proposals. as they are moot under my proposal.

EXPENDITURES,
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participates" in the partnership.250 If the partner materially participates, all
income other than Excluded Income is NESE. If the partner does not, only
his reasonable compensation for services rendered is NESE.
This JeT proposal has a few problems. One of them is the provision that
Excluded IncoITle is NESE for professional services partnerships. This is a
curious change and, as I discuss below, one froITl which the JeT ultimately
backs away. To take one example of Excluded Income to make the point,
dividends that a professional service partnership receives are not likely to be
somehow <"tainted." If dividends should not nonnally constitute NESE, and
since they are not normally compensation for services they should not, there
is no apparent reason they should be NESE to a services partnership. Since
Excluded Income is easily identified, and needs to be identifiable for nonservices partnerships regardless, there is no great additional administrative
burden by continuing the exclusion for services partnerships.
Aside from the Excluded Income issue, providing that all income of a services partnership is NESE makes good sense. In a small minority of cases, a
services partnership may legitimately have income from capital. There may
occasionally be a partner who does not significantly participate in the affairs
of the partnership, though he probably did at some point. But it is likely that
in an overwhelming majority of services partnerships, an objective analysis
would reveal that all the incolTle (other than Excluded Income) is NESE. A
rule which makes that real world reality the taX reality is difficult to attack.
Trying to except out special cases for income from capital or income of lowparticipation partners helps few and creates opportunities for abuse, as well as
consequent enforcement challenges. Partners would claim income cam.e from
capital when it did not, or claim that they participated less than was in fact
the case. The Service would have to spend time dealing with the misguided.
It all would not be worth the effort. It is not clear, however, why the JeT
focused just on professional services partnerships. It seems that the issues
would be the same for any services partnership.
Treating all of a partner's income from a nonservices partnership as NESE
if a partner ITlaterially participates is difficult to justify. A partner might materially participate in a capital intensive partnership where most of the income
of the partnership COITles fcoIn the capital invested, not the partnees services.
Furthermore, since services partnerships are already off the table, this rule is
very likely to catch situations where the incoIne from capital is substantial.
The JeT proposal does have the advantage of providing a bright line, which
can provide for administrative ease, but its bright line is too divorced from.
reality.

250The material participation standards were created by section 469. the passive loss rules.
An activity generally is not passive with regard to taxpayer if he materially participates in it. See
I.R.c. § 469(c)(1). The Regulations contain various ways in which a taxpayer may materially
participate. for example. by participating more than 500 hours during the taxable year. See
Temp. Reg. § 1.469-ST(a).
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In 2006, the JCT proposed a modified version of its 2005 proposal. It
essentially drops, or at least no longer lobbies for, its nonservices partnership proposal. It keeps its services partnership proposal, except that Excluded
Income is no longer NESE.251
The American Bar Association Tax Section has taken several runs at this
issue. I will focus only on the most recent effort, if for no other reason than I
participated in the task force that prepared the Section's comrnents. 252
In its comrnents, which are fairly brief: the Tax Section unsurprisingly
applauds the fact that the JCT dropped its treatrnent of Excluded Income
of services partnerships as NESE.253 The Tax Section, however, objects to
the "wholesale expansion" of the income treated as NESE.254 It is not clear
to what expansion the Tax Section is referring. The real expansion is occurring because an unchanged section 1402 is applying to a broader range of
businesses and thus a broader range of income, and is not corning from the
jCT.255 The Tax Section argues that for both service and nonservice partnerships, the rn.ost appropriate rule is to treat as NESE only that portion of the
net income of a partnership that represents reasonable cornpensation for services rendered. 256 The Tax Section recofilmends that if the JeT approach for
service partnerships is adopted, an exception for ~'de minimis service partners"
be created for those who provide low amounts of services. 257 Under the Tax
Section proposal, NESE for de JTliniJTlis service partners consists of guaranteed payments as well as the partners' distributive share of incoJTle generally,
but in the latter case only to the extent it constitutes reasonable COlTIpensation for services rendered. 258 With regard to nonservices partnerships, the Tax
Section argues C~strongly" that NESE be lirnited to an amount that constitutes
reasonable cornpensation, as income also will corne from capital. 259 Should
that be considered to be administratively unworkable, the Tax Section recornrnends a cotnplex proposal that includes guaranteed payments as NESE.260
Additionally, a "'rn.aterial participation partnees' distributive share of incolTIe
(other than Excluded Incorne) [is] NESE to the extent of reasonable COlTIpensation for services ...."261 The Tax Section further recomrn.ends that there
See JCT 2006, supra note 248.
See ABA Tax Section Suggests Legislative Fix for LLC Self-Employment Tax. 1999 TAX NOTES
TODAY l33-23 Ouly 6, 1999).
253 See ABA SECTION OF TAXATION COMMENTS ON ADDITIONAL OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N 7 (Aug. 3. 2006) [hereinafter
ABA COMMENTS]. I do not address the S corporation proposals. as they are mooted by my
251

252

proposal.
25 4 S ee id.
25.5 See

supra text accompanying notes 206-227.
ABA COMMENTS, supra note 253 at 7.
257 See id. at 8.

256See
258Id.
259Id.
260 Id.

261Id.

at 43.
at B-I.
at 9.

Tax Lawyer, Vol. 62, No. 3

796

SEGrION OF TAXATION

be a rebuttable presumption that guaranteed payments and the distributive
share are NESE up to a "presumption amount;" the Tax Section suggests that
the maximum income to which the Social Security tax is applied ($102,000
in 2008 262) be that presumption amount. 263 As I discuss below, it has become
common for advisors to S corporations to recommend that shareholder-employees only take the Social Security tax maximum as a salary and let the rest
of the S corporation's income ~'flow through') as nonwage income. (Elsewhere
in its comments, the Tax Section endorses this approach.) The Tax Section is
attempting to obtain official sanction for a practice that likely usually understates compensation. If the Social Security tax maximum is the presumption
arn.ount,. it is a safe bet that the vast majority of partners will limit their
compensation to be the presumption amount, and large amounts of what
should be compensation income will escape Social Security and Medicare
taxes. Congress and the Service should not entertain such an invitation to end
run the Social Security and Medicare tax system, particularly given the financial difficulties in which Social Security and Medicare find themselves. 264
I propose amending section 1402 to catch it up with the real world. I discuss my proposal in terms of partnerships, but would apply it to disregarded
entities-sole proprietors as well. What the JeT and the Proposed Regulations
do wisely, and will go a long way toward limiting abuse, is to carve out a special rule for partnerships primarily engaged in the performance of services. I
agree with the JCT that all income of a services partnership (except Excluded
Income) should be classified as NESE. While it is certainly possible that a
given service partnership has a substantial investment in capital, allowing
service partnerships to allocate earnings to capital opens the door wide for
abuse. As I noted above,. for the vast majority of service partnerships, capital
is mostly likely not a large income producing factor. Additionally, there may
occasionally be partners in service partnerships who provide little in the way
of services, but they likely once did if the partnership is allocating income
to them. Further, the income that is being allocated to them is, most likely,
from someone's performance of services. By the mere expedient of shifting
income from active to inactive partners~ Social Security and Medicare taxes
should not be avoided. Treating all incom.e (other than Excluded Income)
from service partnerships as NESE will create little unfairness. while avoiding
many shenanigans~ and reducing the enforcement burdens of the Service. The
Proposed Regulations and the JeT, however, lill'lit the rule for service partnerships to those engaged in the performance of professional services in the
fields of health, law, engineering, architecture. accounting, actuarial science,
or consulting. Yet the underlying policy issues apply to any service partner-

262This amount is adjusted for inflation. See Notice 2007-92. 2007-47 I.R.B. 1036.
263 See ABA COMMENTS. supra note 253 at 9.
264 See generally Social Security: Achieving Sustainable Solvency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance. 109m Cong. 1-17 (2005) [hereinafter Senate Finance Hearing], available at http://
finance.senate.gov/hearings/27402.pdf.
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ship, so I would apply my proposal to any service partnership, not just those
engaged in the specified professions. My broader approach creates the need to
formally define a services partnership. A reasonable definition is any partnership less than 200/0 of the gross income of which is attributable to nonhuman
capital.
For nonservice partnerships, I largely agree with the Tax Section. Anyone
performing services for a nonservices partnership should be required to be
paid reasonable compensation for those services, and that amount should be
NESE. I have no c'presumption amount)) which, as I noted above, will COfllmonly lead to improper tax avoidance. I treat partnership income in excess of
reasonable compensation as income from capital and not as NESE.
The reasonable compensation for services standard may seem unduly vague,
and indeed will create administrative burdens, but in fact it has been one we
have lived with for generations. It. had been regularly applied in the C corporation context. 265 Commonly there, shareholder-employees have attempted
to avoid the C corporation double tax by paying themselves a large salary.
They argued that as salary, the payment is income to the recipient, deductible
to the corporate payor, and thus (they hoped) subject to one level of tax.266
Courts have analyzed these purported salary payments under various standards, and if they concluded the salary was unreasonably high, reduced it,
with the excess being reclassified as a nondeductible dividend. 267 There have
also been occasions where the courts have looked at whether a salary is too
low, as I will discuss below.
Admittedly, allowing courts to resolve compensation issues creates inefficiencies and uncertainties. In a given set of circumstances, taxpayers will not
be able to be completely certain if their allocation between compensation and
a return on capital will be respected, and it might encourage some to play
the audit lottery in the hopes that their abusive scheme will not be uncovered. But the reality is that a fixed rule like that of the JCT for nonservices
partnerships often will be far of the mark. What is appropriate compensation varies greatly based on the alTIount of capital involved, the extent of the
services provided, the nature of the industry involved, and doubtless a host
of other factors. The inequity of a fixed rule in the nonservices partnership
context argues for a more general standard. Further, the fact that all income
(other than Excluded Income) of service partnerships is automatically NESE
will ease the adlTIinistrative burden on the Service and the courts, providing
26SMenard. Inc. v. Commissioner, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. IIJ 50,270, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 1280 (7th
Cit. 2009); Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cit. 1999).
266 See Menard. 2009-1 U.S.T.C.! 50.270, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 1280; Exacto, 196 F.3d at 833;
I.R.C. § 162(a}.
267 See Exacto, 196 F.3d at 833 (7th Cit. 1999) (analyzing the reasonableness of the salary
based on whether an adequate return was being paid to the shareholders on their investment);
Owensby & Kritikos v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying a multiplefactor test); see also Haffner's Servo Stations v. Commissioner, 326 F.3d 1 (1 st Cir. 2003) (applying factors but acknowledging the legitimacy of the Exacto Spring decision).
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something of an offset.
c. The ScoJllaw Gambit. The current definition ofNESE means that a taxpayer who wants to avoid Social Security and Medicare taxes will not find the
partnership soil very fertile. Ah, but an S corporation, that is a very different
matter. 'While a partner may not be an employee of a partnership,268 there
is nothing to keep a shareholder from being an employee of a corporation,
whether it be a C corporation or an S corporation. Employers and employees
are only assessed Social Security and Medicare taxes on the compensation that
is paid to the employee. 269 That fact gives rise to the following tax avoidance
technique using S corporations. The S corporation pays a modest salary or
perhaps no salary at all to its shareholder-employees. The net income of the
S corporation not used to pay salaries "flows through" under the regular S
corporation section 1366 rules, arguably as noncompensation, and therefore
arguably not subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes.
This gambit has been going on for m.any years. I spoke about it at CLE
seIninars some 15 years ago, and advised participants not to form S corporations just for this purpose, as the Service would likely dose this loophole soon.
No one on the panels ever disagreed. We were less than prescient. The Service
has failed to sufficiently police this area. Taxpayers have used S corporations
to avoid both Social Security taxes and Medicare taxes. Since Social Security
taxes are only applied to limited amounts of compensation ($102,000 in
2008 270), S corporation shareholders have to pay themselves relatively low
salaries or no salaries to save these taxes. And, in fact, they have done so. The
Service has challenged the most piggish gambit users, those that have paid
theInselves little or no salary. The Service has won all of these cases. Courts
have generally concluded that the earnings of the S corporation constituted
compensation to the shareholder-eInployees, either under a substance over
forIn analysis or by concluding that the distributed earnings constituted reasonable compensation for the services rendered. 271

Rul. 1969-184. 1969-1 C.B. 256.
See supra text accompanying notes 211-17.
270 This amount is adjusted for inflation. See Notice 2007-92, 2007-47 I.R.B. 1036.
271 See Nu-Look Design v. Commissioner, 356 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2004); Specialty Transp.
and Delivery Servs. v. Commissioner, 2004-1 U.S.T.C. , 50,203.93 A.F.T.R2d 1374 (3d Cit.
2004); Spicer Accounting v. United States. 918 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1990); Dunn & Clark P.A. v.
Commissioner. 853 F. Supp. 365 (D. Idaho 1994); Radtke S.C. v. United States. 712 F. Supp.
143 (E.D. Wis. 1989). affd per curiam. 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990); Veterinary Surgical
Consultants v. Commissioner, 117 T.e. 141 (2001), affd 2004-1 U.S.T.C. , 50,209. 93
A.F.T.R2d 2004-1273 (3d Cir. 2004); W Mgmt. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 543 (Fed. Cl.
2000); Joly v. Commissioner. 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 633, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) , 98,361. In these
cases. the courts often focused on distributed earnings. and typically most or all of the earnings
were distributed. Distribution should not change the analysis. If the S corporation earnings are
indeed best classified as compensation to the shareholder-employees, whether or not they are
distributed in a given year should not change the answer. Typically, the shareholder-employees
have full control over timing. See also Charlotte's Office Boutique v. Commissioner, 121 T.C.
89 (2003). affd, 425 F.3d 1203 (9th Cit. 2005).
268Rev.
269
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Curiously, the Service has never litigated nor expressed an opinion on the
more temperate taxpayer who has the S corporation pay her a moderate salary. 272 For example, in 2008 a neurosurgeon with $1 million of net S corporation income (before salaries) might pay herself the Social Security income
maximum of $1 02,000 as a salary, and let the rest of the income How through
as noncompensation. She thus saves the Medicare tax of 2.90/0 x $898,000 ==
$26,042. 273 And she is a happy woman. I choose the $102,000 Social Security
maximum for a reason. Some advisors are routinely telling their clients to pay
this amount to themselves as salary, and to treat the balance of the S corporation income as noncompensation. 274 One of my own doctors told me he takes
this approach, and clearly is under the impression that he is not obligated to
pay himself more than the Social Security maximum as salary.
In a pure services S corporation, through which, for example, a doctor
or a lawyer practices her profession, this is obviously abusive. Most likely, if
litigated, a court will find all or almost all of the S corporation's income to be
compensation for services as they have in the adITIinedly more Uhoggis~' cases
that have been litigated to date. 275
In the closely held corporation context, courts generally have required
corporations to pay reasonable compensation to their shareholder-eInployees. 276 Continuing with the neurosurgeon example, all of the income of the
S corporation is attributable to her services. Therefore, normally reasonable
compensation is all of the net income of the S Corporation. Reasonable com272 See H.R. 3970. 110th Congo § 1211 (2007) (attacking the totality of the problem within
the S corporation context).
273 Easily the most famous person to use this technique was former senator. vice presidential
nominee. presidential candidate. and bon vivant John Edwards. Over four years (1995-1998),
on income of about $27 million, he saved Medicare taxes of over $590.000. See Michael Moss
& Kate Zernike. Campaign &leaus Edwards's Earnings. N.Y. TIMES. Jul. 10,2004, at A-I. The
journalism on this news story left something to be desired. The technique was port:rayed as a
legitimate "tax shelter." [d. If challenged. a court: most likely would have held almost all of the
S corporation income to be compensation. The specifics: Edwards apparently incorporated
mid-way through 1995. In that year he paid himself a salary of $180,000 on income for the
year (including pre-incorporation) of $5 million. In 1996, the S corporation earnings were $4
million and Edwards received a salary of $360,000. In 1997. the S corporation earnings were
$11 million and Edwards received a salary of $360,000. In 1998, his final year of law practice,
the S corporation earnings were $5.5 million with the same $360.000 salary. See Torn Daley,
Edwards's S Corp: Can ~ Get the Numbers Right?, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 178-32 (Sept. 13,
2004). The total earnings reported in the Daley piece are somewhat less than in the N.¥. Times
Article ($25.5 million versus $27 million). I have not found a source for this, but I have heard
that the $360,000 salary was based on what the average personal injury lawyer makes in North
Carolina, the state where Edwards practiced law. See also. Kip Dellinger, Edwards's S Corp: The
Revised Numbers are Still Absurd, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 183-33 (Sept. 20, 2004).
2741 have not come across written evidence of this, but it is often implied. See, e.g., Alan L.
Olson. Ten Tax Planning Ideas for Small Business in 2009. http://www.groco.com/readingroomltax_smallbusiness.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
275 See supra note 271.
Z76See Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999);Jo~. 76 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 633, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) ,98,361 at 2148.
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pensation must be based on the value of the neurosurgeon herself and not,
say, the value of the average neurosurgeon. Otherwise the top neurosurgeon
in a state making five times the average could argue that her cOITlpensation
should be based on what the average neurosurgeon earns, or one fifth of what
she is actually earning. That would be an easy way to save Medicare and possibly Social Security taxes. But if that top neurosurgeon went to work for a
bona fide employer, she would not accept the average wage, she would insist
on being compensated for her actual worth. That is her reasonable compensation, or in the typical case, all of the net income of the S corporation. What
makes this arguITlent even more persuasive is the fate of the below average
neurosurgeon. Should a neurosurgeon whose S corporation earns less than
the average be deemed to have compensation equal to the average? Obviously,
that would make no sense.
There might occasionally be an argument that there is a sufficient capital
investment so that a small percentage of the income is allocable to capital. But
clearly what is usually going on is an effort to make an end-run around the
Medicare tax and Social Security tax systems. It is axiomatic that substance
controls forrn.,277 and likely in the vast rnajority of cases 278 the substance is
that all of the net income of the S corporation constitutes the earnings of the
service provider, the S corporation form only being used for the purpose of
lowering Medicare or Social Security taxes, or both.
Senator Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, calls those who make such inappropriate use of S corporations "Social Security Scoffiaws."279 The cost to the
fisc frorn this technique is not insubstantial. The underpaYITlent of Medicare
and Social Security taxes through the use of S corporations is estimated to
be about $6 billion per year for each tax, or about $12 billion per year in
total. 280
What is curious is how long the CCteITlperate strategy" has been going on
without the Service addressing the issue. Much of the abuse might have been
stopped by a siITlple revenue ruling from the Service outlining a classic case
such as the neurosurgeon eXaITlple and concluding that it does not work; all
of the S corporation income is wages. Many practitioners are reluctant to
advise clients to violate a revenue ruling. Nor has the Service ever litigated
a case similar to the neurosurgeon example, where a meaningful but clearly
inadequate salary was paid. That likely would have brought closure to the
area. The Service's failure to act has cost the fisc m.any billions. Of course, the
277Prank Lyon Co. v. United States. 435 u.S. 561. 573 (1978).
278 I am aware of no hard data on what percentage of the time this use is made of S corporations.
279 See Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 264, at 29-30.
28°In 2005. the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration estimated that for 20062010, unless the law is changed. the Medicare and Social Security tax gap resulting from
under-compensation of Subchapter S shareholders-employees would be $30.2 billion and
$30.8 billion respectively. See id. at 51 (prepared statement of Hon. Russell George. Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration).
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repeal of Subchapter S will stop the abuse once and for all.
President Oba11'la, when ca11'lpaigning for the presidency, proposed expanding the Social Security tax base by having an additional two percent Social
Security tax apply to the wages of both e11'lployers and e11'lployees (four percent of NESE for the self-em.ployed) for those with wages or NESE in excess
of$250,000. There would be no new taxes on the "doughnut" between Social
Security maxi11'lutn (currently $102,000) and $250,000. 281 The loss to the
fisc of Medicare and Social Security tax revenues will rise exponentially, if
President Obamas proposal is enacted without addressing the use of S corporations to avoid these taxes.
If it is clear that S corporations can no longer be used to avoid Medicare
and Social Security taxes, the political resistance to the repeal of Subchapter
S likely will be dramatically lessened. This is particularly true if the legitimate
benefits of Subchapter S are incorporated into Subchapter K, and taxpayers
are given a taxpayer-friendly way of exiting Subchapter S. I discuss the latter
point in 11'lore detail below

Iv. Popularit::y of the Various Business Entities
Given the way tax law has developed, one would expect C corporations with
their double tax burden to have dropped in popularity, and How-through
entities such as LLCs and S corporations to have increased in popularity.
The data and expectations are in alignlllent. Below is a chart showing the

281 See Notice 2007-92, 2007-47 I.R.B. 1036; see also. e.g., Glenn Kessler, Obama Defines
Social Security "Doughnut" Plan, June 13.2008. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=ahPYltpKKVXA&refer=home.
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relative popularity of C corporations and pass-through entities based on tax
returns: 282
Figure 2.-Num her of C Corporation Returns Compared to tbe Sum
of S Co.-poration and Partnt>rship Returns" 1978-2005
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282 JCX-48-08. supra note 5, at 9 (citing Internal Revenue Service.
published and unpublished data).
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One would also expect the popularity of LLCs to have grown. As I discussed above ot they offer the potential for relative simplicity along with a liability shield. 283 And again, the facts bear this out. This chart shows the relative
popularity of LLCs over general and limited partnerships.284
Figure 4.-Domestic: Partnersbip Returns by Type of Partnersbip.
1989-2005
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Source: Bill Pratt. ~Partnership Returns. 2000.- SOl Bulletin, 22. Fall 2002, and Tim Wheeler and Nina Shumofsky, "Partnership
Returns, 2005," SOl Bulletin, 27, Fall 2007, and Tim Wheeler and Nina Shumofsky, "Partnership Retllm$, 2005," SOl Bulletin,
27, Fall 2007.

283 See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
284JCX-48-08, supra note 5, at 11 (citing Bill Pratt. Part:nership Returns, 2000. SOl
BULLETIN, Fall 2002. at 47; TIm Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky. Part:nership Returns, 2005. SOl
BULLETIN, Fall 2007. at 77-78).
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The following chart shows the number of partnership tax returns by type. 285
LLCs now dominate.

Year

Domestic
General
Partnerships
(thousands)

1,267
1990
1,245
1991
1,214
1992
1993
1.176
1,163
1994
1,167
1995
1,116
1996
1,069
1997
945
1998
1999
898
2000
872
2001
815
2002
780
2003
757
2004
725
2005
729
n.a.-not available

Type of Partnership
Domestic
Domestic
Domestic
Limited
Limited
Limited
Liability
Liability
Partnerships
Companies Partnerships
(thousands)
(thousands) (thousands)
n.a.
n.a.
285
n.a.
n.a.
271
n.a.
271
n.a.
17
n.a.
275
48
n.a.
283
n.a.
119
295
n.a.
221
311
n.a.
349
329
26
470
343
42
589
354
349
719
53
809
69
369
946
78
377
88
1.092
379
1,270
403
89
414
100
1.465

Foreign
Partnerships
(thousands)
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
fl.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
3
5
3
3
4
5

The final chart shows the nUlllber of business entitles filing tax returns
in 1993, 1998, and 2003, classified by asset size and type of entity.286 Small
entities are those with less than $100,000 in assets, llledium sized entities are
those with between $100,000 and $1 million in assets, and large entities are
those with fllore than $1 million in assets. Note that C corporation use has
dropped in all three classes. This is somewhat surprising in the large class, and
may be attributable to the fact that the definition of large is not all that large,
$1 ITlillion. If the large entity class started at $10 Dlillion, the results might be
different. S corporation and tax partnership use has increased, but S corporations dODlinated in 1998 and 2003 alllong small entities and lead in 2003

285JCX-48-08. supra note 5. at 12 (citing Bill Pratt, Partnership Returns, 2000. Sal
Fall 2002, at 45; Tim Wheeler and Nina Shumofsky, Partnership Returns, 2003.
Sal BULLETIN. Fall 2005. at 50; Tim Wheeler and Nina Shurn.ofsky. Partnership Returns,
2005. SOl BULLETIN, Fall 2007, at 69).
286JCX-48-08, supra note 5. at 10.
BULLETIN.
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among medium sized entities. 287
Figure 3.-The Number of Small. Medium. and Large Business Entities
by Type of Legal Entity. 1993, 1998,2003
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Source: Joint Committee on Taxation staff tabulations of Statistics ofIncome, published and l.U1pUblished data.

It is conunonly said that LLCs are the <~entity of choice," yet, as of 2003, S
corporations continue to lead the pack among small and medium sized business entities, though the prior charts show LLCs to also be very popular in
2003. To what is the S corporation popularity attributable? Taxpayers do not
explain why they choose a particular entity when they file their tax returns,
but the common belief is that S corporations continue to be popular because
of the perceived opportunity they provide to reduce Social Security and
Medicare taxes. For service businesses" tax partnerships such as LLCs offer
fewer advantages. As they are typically businesses without a large am.ount of
capital, property contributions and distributions likely do not play a large
role, and section 754 elections-which can adjust partnership asset basestend to be less valuable. These are two areas where partnerships have significant advantages. 288
287 C corporations were popular among small and medium sized entities in 1998. This likely
is attributable to the availability of the medical expense deductions. In a C corporation, tnedical insurance expenses paid to employees, including shareholder-employees. are deductible
from income under section 162{a) and are not income to the employees due to section 106.
This benefit was omy available to S corporation shareholders who owned two percent or less of
the stock of the S corporation. I.R.C. § 1372(a)(2). A comparable benefit is now available to
the self-employed. including partners and greater-than-two percent shareholders of S corporations. in section 162(1). It permits thetn to deduct the cost of medical insurance. See Pub. L.
No. 105-206. 112 Stat. 685 (l998); Pub. L. No. 105-277. 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
288See supra text accompanying notes 66-74. 84-92.
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On the other hand, the ability to vary allocations, which can readily be
done in a partnership, can be important to a service business. S corporations
cannot vary allocations as such, but must allocate income and losses based on
shareholdings. 289 It is possible to give a shareholder-employee an option to buy
Inore shares, but it is highly awkward to continually adjust share ownership.
An S corporation can make bonus salary payments, but that does not avoid
the Medicare or Social Security taxes, which applies to all salaries paid, and
thus a principal motivation for using S corporations is removed. 290 However,
the vast majority ofS corporations have rwo or fewer shareholders {over 880/0
in 2004).291 For S corporations with few shareholders, the need to vary allocations is much less than it is, for example, for large and medium-sized law
firms, which, not by coincidence, are usually not S corporations. 292 Large law
firms likely cannot meet the 100 shareholder requirement. MediulTI-sized law
firms that would use the S corporation format likely can only vary incomes, as
a practical matter, through bonus salary payments. Again, as salary payments
do not avoid Social Security and Medicare taxes, there is little lTIotivation to
use the S corporation. That being the case, most medium-sized law firms (as
well as most large law firms) are LLCs or LLPs.
Another disadvantage of S corporations when contrasted with partnerships
is the inability to include corporate borrowings in the bases of the shareholder's stock. 293 But the need for greater bases is most acute when businesses operate at a loss, not typical of the average service business. Further,
the well-inforlTIed can arrange for loans to be made directly to shareholders
who then can contribute or loan the funds to the S corporation. According to
2005 data, 99% of S corporations have fewer than $1 million in receipts. 294
Shareholder guaran tees of debt are likely to be required regardless for finns of
this size, so there is no great sacrifice in having the shareholders borrow the
funds directly. Further, if the S corporation has only one or rwo shareholders,
som.e of the problems with such direct borrowings, discussed earlier, are less
likely to arise. 295 For example, it is easier for one or two shareholders to buy
encumbered property and lease it to the corporation than for 20 shareholders
to do so.
In a partnership, the partnership can usually give a service provider a profits
interest tax free. 296 But for a closely held service business, this ability is rarely
of great import. It is a very valuable feature in a capital intensive enterprise,
where one person provides the funds and another the "brains," but in the
289I.RC. §§ 1366(a). 1377(a).
29°I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 311 I (a).
291 See SOl TAX STATS. supra note 110.
292 Robert W Hillman. Organizational Choices of Professional Service Firms: An Empirical
Study. 58 Bus. LAw. 1387. 1401 (2003).
293 See supra t:ext accompanying notes 79-83.
294 JCX-48-08. supra note 5. at 15.
295 See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
296 See supra text accompanying notes 93-104.
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typical closely held~ capital-light service partnership, this distinction does not
exist. There is relatively little capital involved, and usually everyone is providing services in some form.
As this discussion demonstrates, the main advantages of partnerships are
of little value to small, closely held service businesses. When that fact is contrasted with the possible ability to save substantial Medicare taxes and possibly even Social Security taxes with an S corporation, it is no contest, the S
corporation wins. Thus, a strong circumstantial case can be made that "Social
n
Security and Medicare tax dodging is a primary, perhaps -che primary, force
behind the use of S corporations.
While the repeal of Subchapter S will end the abusive avoidance of Social
Security and Medicare taxes, it is important not to stop there. It is vital that
the rules for assessing Social Security and Medicare taxes be brought into
alignment with today's LLC-rich universe.

V. H.R. 4137
It is a happy day for a law professor when a suggestion in a law review article
shows up in legislation. I had that good fortune with H.R. 4137, introduced
in 2004 by Congressman Am.ory Houghton, Jr. Alas, that was the extent of
my good fortune. H.R. 4137, as it happened, went absolutely nowhere; a
pity, really, because it was a forward-looking, if imperfect bill.
H.R. 4137 prohibited further S elections. After a ten-year grace period,
it provided that existing S corporations were deemed to elect to be taxed as
partnerships under Subchapter K, though the bill also allowed theIll to elect
to make the switch before that. 297 Moreover, it permitted Illost nonpublicly
traded C corporations to elect to be taxed under Subchapter K as well. 298
Under the bill, when an S corporation elected Subchapter K, it -was treated
as if it liquidated and formed a partnership. Thus, as noted above, the S
corporation recognized the gain and could recognize the loss inherent in its
assets;299 that gain or loss, like any S corporation gain or loss, flowed through
to the shareholders under section 1366. To make the gain and loss recognition more palatable, the bill provided that the gain and loss recognized by the
S corporation was amortized over five years, which lessened the pain if there
was a gain and caused pain if there was a loss. There was nothing in the bill,
however, to stop an S corporation from actually liquidating and fonning, for

297H.R. 4137 does not take disregarded entities into account. H.R 4137, supra note 4.
298Corporations ineligible to elect under Subchapter S are not allowed to elect subchapter K.
See I.RC. § 1361(b)(2). Included in this group are financial institutions which use the reserve
method of accounting for bad debts described in section 585 (e.g. ITlany banks). insurance
companies subject to tax under Subchapter L, corporations to which an election under section
936 applies (relating to Puerto Rico and possession tax credit), and domestic international
sales corporations.
299Code section 336 provides that gain is recognized on the liquidating distribution of
appreciated property but limits loss recognition if the liquidating distribution is to a related
person. See I.R.C. § 336(a). (d).
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example, an LLC. That approach permits a loss (or a gain) to be recognized
fully and inunediately.300
Under the bill, any distribution from the erstwhile S or C corporationnow-partnership to its shareholders-now-partners was a taxable dividend
to the extent it would have been a dividend under the rules of Subchapter
5. 301 As discussed above, dividends are paid from a corporation's earnings and
profits. 302 As also discussed above;> an S corporation cannot generate earnings
and profits, but it can inherit them from a C corporation; a distribution from
an S corporation is a taxable dividend to the shareholders if, to simplify, the
5 corporation has already distributed its own net income, but has earnings
and profits. 303 Under the bill" an S corporation's or C corporation's earnings
and profits were passed on to the partnership. H.R. 4137 provided a rule
for the 5 corporation-now-partnership or C corporation-now-partnership
that was similar to the rule that currently exisrs for S corporations. If, again
to simplify, the partnership had fully distributed its own post-conversion net
income,304 any additional distributions were taxable dividends to the partners
to the extent of the partnership's earnings and profits. This, of course, was an
effort by the bill to retain the double taxation that would have applied to the
C corporation if it had never elected to be taxed as a partnership (or never
elected Subchapter S on its way to being a partnership). Note, though, that
the partnership would have had control over the tirning by choosing or not
choosing to make the distribution. Keeping track of the earnings and profits
over tirne poses a significant burden. Under the H.R. 4137, earnings and
profits never expired.
Under H.R. 4137, it often would have made more sense for an S corporation with earnings and profits to actually liquidate and fonn another entity
than to sirnply elect (or be deemed to elect) Subchapter K. As discussed above,
the S corporation that did not actually liquidate was still deemed to liquidate
and was still required to recognize the gains and losses inherent its assets. The
rnain tax advantage under the bill to electing K as opposed to actually liquidating was that the recognized gains were taken in to account over five years.
But in the case of an actual liquidation. the earnings and profits account is
wiped clean. 305 No earnings and profits means no dividends. Had H.R. 4137
been enacted, S corporations with earnings and profits and net gains in their
assets would have needed to balance the deferral of tax gain against the ability to avoid dividends. Of course, if the 5 corporation had both net losses in
its assets and earnings and profits (less cornmon, but entirely possible), there
300S u bject

to section 336(d).
See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
302 See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
303 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
304 Any S corporation net inCOflle retained upon the conversion is added to this amount.
305The authority for this is implicit in the operation of sections 334(a} and 336 and the
fact that no provision of the code provides otherwise. See BrrTKER &: EUSTICE. supra note 10.
, lO.05[2][b].
301
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would have been nothing to balance. Liquidation would have been the order
of the day.
H.R. 4137 also expanded the scope of section 1374. Under the bilL upon
the election to be taxed as a partnership, a C corporation, unlike an S corporation, did not recognize any gains or losses inherent in its assets. 306 Instead,
section 1374 was applied to the C corporation-now-partnership.307 Recall,
that as enacted section 1374 applies to an S corporation if it was once a C
corporation or acquired the assets of a C corporation in a tax-favored transaction. 308 "When the S corporation recognizes a gain inherent in an erstwhile
C corporation asset, whether by sale or distribution to a shareholder, a corporate level tax applies, and it applies at the highest corporate tax rate. 309 The
objective of section 1374 is to ensure that the net gain inherent in the assets
originally held by the C corporation is subject to a corporate level tax, notwithstanding the fact that the assets are held by an S corporation.
How H.R. 4137 applied section 1374 to the C corporation-now-partnership is not entirely clear. The idea, clearly, was that there be two levels of tax
on the net gains inherent in the erstwhile C corporation assets, one at the
entity (i.e. partnership) level at the highest corporate tax rate, and one at the
partner level. Further, the thne period during which section 1374 applied was
expanded froIll the ten years that norfilally applies to 25 years. 310 The section
1374 provision of the bill was, in the filain, unworkable. Section 1374 works
in the S corporation context because gains and losses normally are recognized
if an asset leaves corporate solution. 311 But that is not necessarily true for
partnerships. Under section 731 (b}, a partnership nonnally recognizes no
gain or loss when it distributes property to partners. The distributee partners
generally take a carryover basis in the distributed property.312 The equivalent
of an aniIllal tagging rule could have been added to H.R. 4137, providing
that whoever disposes of a covered asset within the 25 year tiIlle period in
a taxable transaction Illust pay the corporate tax, but that would have been
exceptionally difficult to enforce, especially over 25 years. Alternatively, the
Subchapter K rules could have been changed to require gain recognition any
time a covered asset is distributed, but again that would have been difficult to
enforce, especially over 25 years, plus does injury to one of the more fundafilental rules of partnership taxation. Also, it is not apparent why the ten year
3{)(iH.R. 4137. supra note 4.
3{)7Id.
308See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
309 See I.R.C. § 1374.
310H.R. 4137 is not dear in this regard, but apparently an electing S corporation does not
recognize the gains or losses in assets subject to section 1374 before the conversion to a partnership. Section 1374 continues to apply as it would to an electing C corporation. See supra
text accompanying notes 51-52. Further, if section 1374 already applies. the ten-year rule (and
not the 25 year rule) applies. provided the ten years expires before the election is made to be
a partnership.
311 This is normally a taxable event. See I.RC. §§ 311> 336.
312See I.R.C. § 732(a).
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time fraIne of current section 1374 was increased to 25 years. The extension
creates a huge~ additional cOlTlpliance burden, and ten years is a time limit the
world has been living with comfortably since section 1374 was enacted.
Clearly, Congressman Houghton was attempting to permit the laudable,
allowing C corporations to elect Subchapter K, while avoiding the objectionable, permitting large amounts of C corporation gain to avoid a corporate
level tax. He doubtless also wanted to avoid excessive revenue losses to the
fisc. I will return to this issue when addressing my own proposal, but applying section 1374 in the manner H.R. 4137 did was at best an awkward solution.
Finally, H.R. 4137 fllade useful, if insufficient, steps in related areas. It
specifically allowed a section 351 incorporation followed by a section 368
reorganization, provided that substantially all of the assets of an active trade
or business were involved. 313 It also contained a provision on section 1402
that was close to the AICPKs proposal. 314 The intent behind both provisions
was good, but for the reasons I discussed in detail above, I recolTlmend a different approach. 315

VI. Repeal Subchapter K Inst:eadJ
Much ink has been spilled on the problems with Subchapter K.316 It is surely
true that abuses can happen. While it does not usually make the life of a
Mom and Pop LLC all that challenging, Subchapter K and its regulations are
an extraordinarily cOfllplex area of tax law. Of just one piece of this puzzle,
the special allocation rules of section 704(b), Professor Lawrence Lokken
fafllously wrote: "[They are] a creation of prodigious complexity . . . essentially impenetrable to all but those with the time, talent, and determination to
become thoroughly prepared experts on the subject."317 Professors George Yin
and David Shakow, as Reporters for the American Law Institute, produced
an ifllpressive study that was critical of Subchapter K. In it they proposed
"an optilTlal tax system" for the "simple private business firm" grounded in
313H.R. 4137. supra note 4.
314See supra text accompanying notes 244-48.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 264-67.
316 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Inside Basis Adjustments and Hot Asset Exchanges in
Parmership Distributions. 47 TAX L. REv. 3 (1991); Cunis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership
Taxation, 47 TAX L. REv. 105 (1991); Noel B. Cunningham. Commentary Needed Reform:
Tending the Sick Rose. 47 TAX L. REv. 77 (I991); Mark P. Gergen. Reforming Subchapter K'
Special AJiocations. 46 TAX L. REv. 1 (1990); Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business
Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K. 4 FLA. TAX REv. 109 (1998); William S.
McKee, Parmership Allocations: the Need for an Entity Approach. 66 VA. L. REv. 1039 (1980);
Philip F. Postelwaite et aI .• A Critique of the ALI'S Federal Income Tax Project-Subchapter K:
Proposals on the Taxation ofPartners. 75 GEO. L.J. 423 (1986); Rebecca S. Rudnick. Enforcing
the Fundamental Premises of Partn~hip Taxation. 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 229 (1993); see also
Karen Burke. Parmership Distributions: Options for Reform, 3 FL. TAX REv. 677 (1998); Darryll
Jones. Toward Equity and Efficiency in Partnership Allocations, 25 VA. TAX REv. 1047 (2006).
317Lawrence Lokken. ParmershipAllocations. 41 TAX L. REv. 545,621 (1986).
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Subchapter K~ but "with a strong resemblance to Subchapter S."318 Professors
Yin and Shakow did not launch a full frontal assault on Subchapter K, perhaps cognizant of the political perils of such an effort. In addition to the
private business firm proposal~ they did recommend a number of substantial
changes to Subchapter K, however. 319
I actually think that Subchapter K has much to com.mend it. The flexibility .
it offers prornotes economic efficiency. Yes, abuses can happen, but I have
yet to see any data suggesting that they are a large part of the partnership
pie. Further. S corporations. with their rigid qualification rules, particularly
the one class of stock requirefllent, are simply unsuitable for many complex
business undertakings where income is often allocated in tranches to different
owners. But happily, I do not need to engage that debate here. The reality is
that repealing or dramatically changing Subchapter K is a political nonstarter.
Perhaps the best evidence of that fact is that Professors Yin and Shakow were
not able to persuade the American Law Institute, a reforrn-oriented and-in
the view of some, moderately progressive-organization, to adopt their views,
notwi thstanding that they did not even go so far as to recommend repeal of
Subchapter K. Repeal of Subchapter K has never been give serious consideration by Congress. In contrast, there has actually been a bill in the House
recorn.rn.ending repeal of Subchapter S.320 Further, some kind of partnership
taxation will always have to be with us if for no other reason than taxpayers
can inadvertently find thelllselves in a state law partnership.321 They cannot
inadvertently end up in an S corporation. So, if we cannot repeal Subchapter
K, surely we should repeal Subchapter S. As the above discussion indicates,
the legitirnate benefits of Subchapter S are relatively few in number and can
either be incorporated into Subchapter K or be achieved by some adjustments
to Subchapter C. Having two pass-through regimes is inefficient. Similarly
situated taxpayers are taxed differently, to the advantage of those with skilled
advisors, often to the disadvantage of those with unskilled advisors. This
violates principles of vertical equity. Well-advised taxpayers can effectively
choose, albeit within limits, how much tax to pay. Taxpayers will exploit the
differences between their regimes for their benefit. A classic example is using
S corporations to beat the Medicare tax. These considerations make it more
difficult for the government to assess a reliable, appropriate tax. 322 Further, the
318See ALI Report. supra note 91, at 125. This would have been an elective system. For
example, it would have in some cases severely restricted special allocations and would have
required gain recognition (as well as loss recognition in the case of a liquidation) on the distribution of assets. See also id. at 129-30 (Table 1); id. at 183 (Proposal 4-2(l)(a»; Uf. at
215 (Proposal 4-5(1)(a»; id. at 300 (Proposal 5-1 (l)(a»; Jeffery A. Maine, Linking Lim#ed
Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique of the ALI Reporters' Study on the Taxation of Private
Business Enterprises, 62 U. PITI'. L. REv. 223 (2000).
319 See generally ALI Report, supra note 91. at 273-425.
320H.R. 4137. supra note 4; see supra text accompanying notes 297-315.
321 See A.r.A.N R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RlBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIPS
! 2.0I(c) (1988).
322 See ALI Report. supra note 91. at 45-47.
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Service is required to train personnel in two different pass-through regimes.
That said, Subchapter K is a far from perfect taxing regimen. The ALI
Report and others have pointed out its deficiencies and made intelligent recommendations for improverrtent. Reform of Subchapter K should continue.
But the fact that Subchapter K is in need of reform is not a reason to continue
a parallel pass-through regime in Subchapter S. One of the two systems needs
to go. It won't be Subchapter K; therefore it should be Subchapter S. Indeed:J
the existence of Subchapter S impedes the reform of Subchapter K. Having
two system.s in play can prevent policy makers and the Service from becoming fully focused on one. It spreads limited human resources thin. Likely, the
pace of reform of Subchapter K will pick up~ once Subchapter S is off the
playing field.

VII. Let NonpubUc Corporations ColDe to the Party
In my prior artide~ I discussed the possibility of also permitting nonpublicly
traded C corporations to elect Subchapter K. At that time, I demurred. I
felt repealing Subchapter S was a daring enough move. While I was (and
am) aware of no data on the cost to the fisc of allowing only nonpublic C
corporations to elect Subchapter K, there was data on the cost of integration
for public and nonpublic corporations in the aggregate, and that number was
intimidating: $36.8 billion in 1991 dollars.323 As I discuss below, the cost of
permitting nonpublic C corporations to elect Subchapter K may now not ~e
large. 324 Further, we live in a different tax and nontax universe than when I
wrote flly prior article. Somewhat emboldened by H.R. 4137, I believe the
tim.e is ripe to permit domestic, nonpublic C corporations to elect Subchapter
K as well (or become disregarded entities if they have a single shareholder).325
Like H.R. 4137, I would exclude corporations that are currently ineligible for
Subchapter S from fllaking this election. 326
C corporations can have highly cOfllplex stock and debt structures. In
many cases, those structures may make the switch to Subchapter K impracticaL But usually, Subchapter K 'Will be up to the challenge. Many partnerships
323Various integration proposals were considered. The one referenced in the text involves
an allocation to shareholders of a 31 % credit for corporate taxes paid. Tax-exempt and foreign shareholders would receive no credit. The credit would accompany an allocation of
income to the shareholder. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVlDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS 152 (1992).
324See infra text accompanying notes 358-363.
325As did H.R. 4137. I define a nonpublic C corporation as a domestic corporation no stock
of which is readily tradable on an established securities market or otherwise.
326Generally. a pass-through regime is highly awkward for these types of entities. Section
1361 (b)(2) lists corporations that are ineligible to elect to be taxed under Subchapter S. Included
are financial institutions which use the reserve method of accounting for bad debts described
in section 585 (e.g. many banks). insurance companies subject to tax under Subchapter L,
corporations to which an election under section 936 applies (relating to Puerto Rico and possession tax credit). and domestic international sales corporations. See LRC. § 1361 (b)(2); see
also EUSTICE &. KUNTZ. supra note 59, ! 3.05.
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have highly complex ownership and debt structures, but thrive in Subchapter
K.327

The Federal government is regularly changing the ground under the business owners' feet. An owner who 15 years ago rationally chose a C corporation,
might not have done so if she had known of the impending LLC revolution.
The tax benefits that she may have gleaned by using a C corporation are, given
the overall double tax burden, unlikely to have been so great as to justify locking her into a now outdated choice. Further, why should different nonpublic
business entities be taxed differently? Closely held businesses should at least
have the option of playing on the same field, making for greater horizontal
equity. Other countries have taken a uniform approach. 328 I recommend that
the United. States also take a more uniform approach, though I would not
make the election of Subchapter K mandatory for C corporations. As I discussed above, it would be very difficult for nonpublic entities to get by wholly
without Subchapter C.329 As I discuss below, I recommend that C corporations be allowed to switch to Subchapter K on a taxpayer-friendly basis. 330

VIII. The Nuts and Bolts
A. S Corporations
A first step toward repeal is to prohibit any further S elections, as of the effective date of any relevant act. Here I follow the lead ofH.R. 4137. 331 No new
corporations and no existing C corporations may make S elections. There is
no need to create more of a dying entity. There is little unfairness at work here
for potential future users, as the LLC usually constitutes a perfectly viable,
indeed usually preferable, alternative, especially if the integration proposals I
outlined above are adopted.
How should taxpayers who are already operating as S corporations be
treated? They cannot be expected to adapt to new rules overnight. But there
is also little logic in allowing the indefinite continuation of a dying entity.
The sensible answer is to give existing S corporations a meaningful amount of
time to exit gracefully. How much tiDle is enough time? There is no certain

327 See, e.g., Karen T. Lohnes, John Schmalz & Craig Gerson, Value Equals Basis and Partners'
Distributive Share: Stuffing, Fili-ups, and Waurfolls, 105}. TAX'N 109 (2006).
328 Germany. for example; see Michael J. Munkert. Fallstricke der neuen Thesaurierungsbegitnstigung. STEUERCONSULTANT 34 (2007).
329 See supra text accompanying notes 113-67.
3300ne might think that permitting C corporations to continue to elect Subchapter S during the ten-year death watch might be a way of facilitating the transition to Subchapter K. but
in fact that often. perhaps usually, will not be the case. The S corporation one-class-of-stock
rule of section 1361 (b) (1)(0) will make Subchapter S unavailable to many existing C corporations. Also. section 1374 will take away much of any tax benefit that Subchapter S provides.
See infra text accompanying notes 358-64.
331 See S Corp. Burial, supra note 3, at 643.
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answer, but the ten-year time period ofH.R. 4137 seems reasonable. 332
During the ten-year death watch, an S corporation may:
1. Elect disregarded entity status, if it has a single owner (and be deemed
to liquidate and distribute its assets to the single owner),
2. elect Subchapter K, it is has two or more owners (and be deemed to
liquidate and form a partnership)~
3. eleCt Subchapter C (no liquidation),
4. formally liquidate by the end of the ten-year term, or
5. take no action, in which case at the end of the ten-year term it is
deerned to liquidate and form a partnership or, if it has a single owner,
it is deerned to liquidate and become a disregarded entity.
If the S corporation does not actually liquidate (and does not elect Suchapter
C), it needs to be deerned to be liquidated for tax purposes (1) to establish
capital accounts for the partners correctly,333 (2) for section 704(c), sections
707(a)(2)(B), and 737~34 to apply properly in the case of partnerships, and
(3) to establish the owner's bases in the assets properly if the S corporation
becornes a disregarded entity. The regular S corporation rules apply until the
liquidation, deerned or actual, takes place, with one rnodification. I apply
my recommended reform of Social Security and Medicare taxes to S corporations during the transition period. Thus, all income of an S corporation
prirnarily engaged in the performance of services is subject to Social Security
and Medicare taxes. For capital intensive S corporations, on the other hand,
reasonable compensation for services rendered rnust be paid, but only that
cornpensation is subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. 335
What tax rules should apply to a deemed or actual liquidation? Under the
current rules of Subchapter S, the liquidating S corporation must generally
recognize any gain or loss inherent in its assets. 336 That gain or loss, of course,
generally is not taxed to the corporation but is passed through to the shareholders.337 The shareholders recognize a gain or loss based on the difference
between the fair market value of the assets received and the basis of the stock
they hold. 338 It seems inappropriate, however, to apply the current S corporation rules and require gain (or pennit loss) recognition on the termination of

332 In my prior article I suggested five years. Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small
minds. See S Corp. Burial. supra note 3. at 644.
333 See Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2)(ii) , -1 (b)(l)(iv).
334 See supra text accompanying note 74.
335 See supra notes 264-67. Perhaps the easiest way to accomplish this is (0 bring S corporations under the self-employment rules. as opposed to continuing their current coverage under
sections 3101. 3111. and related provisions. See JCX-48-08. supra note 5. at 68; H.R. 3970.
supra note 272.
336I.R.C. § 336(a); see supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
337I.R.C. § 1366.
338I.R.C. § 331 (a). The gain or loss to the shareholders may not be significant given the
How-through of the S corporation's liquidation gains and losses. which adjusts the shareholders> bases before the distribution is made to them. Reg. § 1.1367-1(f).
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S corporation status. 339 The taxpayers are being forced to use another entity;)
making gain recognition unfair. Typically.. no real disposition is being made.
Most owners will continue the same business. 340 This makes loss recognition
inappropriate. I therefore recommend that S corporations and their shareholders be allowed to move to partnerships or disregarded entities on a tax favored
basis. I apply Subchapter K, and not Subchapter S, to the liquidation of S
corporations both in the case of partnerships-to-be and (notwithstanding the
metaphysical challenges) disregarded entities-to-be. I also, of course, apply
Subchapter K to the for.mation of any subsequent partnership. Subchapter
K generally makes the liquidation and formation process tax free. Where a
partnership is formed, the typical result of this process is that the erstwhile
shareholder's basis in his stock becolTles his basis in what is now a partnership interest. 341 Note that this process gives each partner a capital account in
the partnership equal to the partnership interest's fair market value, and the
partnership "book bases" in the partnership assets also equal to their fair market value. 342 Where the S corporation becomes a disregarded entity:> applying
Subchapter K-like rules will usually give the single owner a carryover basis in
the assets of the S corporation. 343 While the liquidation rules of Subchapter K
are much more taxpayer friendly than those of Subchapter S, it is possible for
gain or loss to be recognized under Subchapter K on a liquidation in limited
circUlTlstances. The liquidation rules are unlikely to apply, however, especially
if the assets are distributed (or deemed distributed) to the owners in proportional, undivided interests. 344 I considered rules that would avoid the recognition of all gain or loss in all circumstances, but found that the cOlTlplexities
these rules generated were not worth the statutory effort given that the issue
should be a minimal one.
Sufficiently creative taxpayers can find ways of inappropriately taking
advantage of these generous rules for liquidation of S corporations. To stop,
or at least impede, this, I recommend Congress authorize the Service to adopt

339See I.R.C. §§ 331 (a). 336(a).
340They may want to actually liquidate the S corporation and form, for example, an LLC.
Or they may want to continue using the state law corporation, which either is disregarded for
tax purposes if it has a single owner, or is taxed under Subchapter K if it has multiple owners.
341 See I.R.C. §§ 731(a), 721(a), 732.
342See Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2)(ii) , -1 (b)(1)(iv). This sentence is probably Greek to those
without a partnership tax background. Explaining it here would require a multiple-page
footnote. For those wishing to develop that background, see WILLIS. et at .• supra note 153,
, 10.04[3][c].
343See LR.C. §§ 721 (a), 731 (a), 732.
344Gain will be recognized if money is distributed in excess of the erstwhile shareholder's
basis in her stock. Loss will be recognized if only money. inventory, and accounts receivable
are distributed, and the owner's outside stock basis exceeds the carryover basis she takes in
these assets. See I.RC. §§ 731 (a), 732. One might ask if an artificial loss could be created. for
example, by distributing money, inventory, and accounts receivable to a partner in such a way
that a loss is generated, notwithstanding the fact that on a fair market value basis the partner
has an economic gain section 751 (b) usually will kibosh that effort. however.

Tax Lawyer. Vol. 62. No. 3

816

SEer-ION OF TAXATION

an anti-abuse rule that applies to this process. 345
Note that under ITIy proposal, S corporations do not have the option of
liquidating under the current S corporation rules. This is to prevent taxpayers
frolll cherry-picking tax treatlTIent, that is, using Subchapter S for S corporations with net losses in their assets and Subchapter K for S corporations with
net gains. It is appropriate, however, to have a brief transition period of perhaps six Illonths where S corporations are allowed to liquidate under either
Subchapter K or S. Taxpayers planning to liquidate anyway should not be
caught unawares by the statutory change. While cherry-picking can happen
during the six months, the associated revenue losses are not likely to be great
given the limited tirn.e frame. Further, S corporation losses and deductions,
including depreciation deductions, generally flow through to the shareholders. 346 In other words, the losses have often already been recognized by the
shareholders. As a consequence, it is not likely that there are a large number
of S corporations with large amounts of losses inherent in their assets, though
there will be some with economic losses that have not yet been taken into
account for tax purposes. 347
While it is difficult to predict with certainty in the absence of hard data, it
seems doubtful that permitting largely tax-free liquidations of S corporations
will generate unacceptable revenue losses for the fisc. Under the current rules,
S corporations avoid distributing assets that contain significant amounts of
appreciation. Instead, they commonly retain the property in corporate solution, depriving the government of a recognition event. In addition, Social
Security and Medicare tax revenues will no longer be lost, creating a substantial offset. If economic calculations reveal that the cost to the fisc is unduly
large, some compromise with the suggested approach may have to be found.
What if the S corporation has earnings and profits or unrecognized section
1374 gains?348 The equities in this regard are not as strong as the equities in
favor of allowing nonrecognition of the (nonsection 1374) gains and losses
inherent in the S corporation assets. The earnings and profits and section
1374 gains originated with a C corporation, and avoiding any tax consequence also avoids what would have been part of the Subchapter C double
tax system, and Subchapter C is not being recommended for repeal. That
said, if a C corporation liquidates under the current rules, it recognizes the

345 One example: A and B own all of the stock of an S corporation. A individually owns asset
X and B individually owns asset Y. They wish to exchange these assets with each other. The
assets do not qualify for like-kind exchange treatment under section 1031. To avoid gain recognition. they could each contribute the assets to the S corporation. The contribution would
be tax free under section 351 (a). As parr of a subsequent liquidation of the S corporation under
Subchapter K. the S corporation could distribute asset Y to A and asset X to B, potentially tax
free. See I.R.C. § 731.

346I.R.C. § 1366.
347 A drop in the value of land, for example, would normally only be recognized in the case
of taxable disposition. as land is not depreciable.
348 See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
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gains and possibly the losses inherent in its assets, but its earnings and profits
account is wiped clean. 349 Further, the section 1374 gains are only recognized
for ten years after the C corporation assets find their way into an S corporation. 350 Since under my proposal, the S corporation has up to ten years to
liquidate~ section 1374 by its own terms normally can be avoided by waiting
until the end of the section 1374 ten-year term, ·which will be reached before
the end of the ten-year S corporation liquidation term of my proposal. 351 If
the S corporation chooses to liquidate before the end of the section 1374
ten-year term, it is presumably due to some tax or other advantage. Having
section 1374 fully apply in these circumstances is not unfair. Accordingly, on
liquidation of the S corporation, any remaining section 1374 gains are recognized, but there should be no dividend effect. Below, I raise the possibility
of C corporations being allowed to elect to liquidate under Subchapter K. If
that is permitted, it would of course not make sense to apply section 1374 to
liquidating S corporations.
A danger, though not an especially large one, is that C corporations, anticipating the law change, might elect Subchapter S shortly before the new statute is enacted. Under my proposal, they cannot elect after enactment. The
C-now-S corporation could wait out the ten-year section 1374 period and
then liquidate, generally tax free, under Subchapter K. But the C corporation
must live with Subchapter S and section 1374 for ten years. It is not much differently positioned than a C corporation that legitimately elects Subchapter
S, say, one year before the enactment of the new statute. While there is some
minor potential for game playing here, I do not believe it is worth addressing
statutorily. Of course, if C corporations are permitted to exist under the rules
of Subchapter K, discussed below, then there is no abuse potential.
Should the proposed act contain continuity of business enterprise and
ownership interest tests? Should the business of the erstwhile S corporation
be required to be continued for some period of time? Should the erstwhile
shareholders be required to stay on as partners for some period of time? 352
While the failure to apply those tests may mean that some owners will be able
to convert corporate assets to personal use without an income tax effect,353
on the whole, the better answer to the question is not to apply continuity of
interest standards. Because S corporations are being forced out of existence,
349See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. 305.
35°I.RC. § 1374(d)(7).
351 Since no neW" S elections are permitted, the last possible S election would take place the
day before the act takes effect, m.eaning the section 1374 ten-year term expires the day before
the proposed statute's ten-year term.
352These rules apply to corporate reorganizations. See BITTKER &: EUSTICE, supra note 1 O~
" 12.21. 12.61(2).
3S3This could not happen with an S corporation, since the distribution of property by an S
corporation to its shareholders causes gain and possibly loss to be recognized under sections
311 (b) and 336. On the other hand. a distribution of property by a partnership to a partner
is generally not recognized to either party. See I.R.C. § 731; but see I.RC. §§ 704(c)(1)(B),
707(a)(2)(B). 737. 751 (b).
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the equities favor an owner-friendly set of rules. Also, aside frofil the possibility of converting business assets to personal use, which will likely be uncomInon, the relevant tax consequences after the conversion are sifililar to, or even
worse than, those before the conversion. Some examples: A sale of stock in
the S corporation usually generates a capital gain or loss. The sale of a partnership interest may generate ordinary income. 354 The gain or loss on the sale of
business assets generally flows through to the shareholders for S corporations
and to partners for partnerships. Also, determining whether the continuity
tests are met will create additional complexity that does not seem worth the
statutory effort. Numerous questions will arise. How long should the business be operated? What if the assets are used in a different business? How
Inuch of an ownership change is permitted? Many of these issues have been
addressed in the corporate context. But in the case of S corporations being
forced out of existence, the courts might address these issues differently. 355
Further, if continuity provisions are enacted, most owners likely will continue
the business long enough to pass muster" so little revenue will be raised.
The conversion of S corporations can generate state tax and nontax costs, if
the corporation actually liquidates and contributes its assets to, for example,
an LLC. State income and, more commonly, transfer taxes can apply. These
vary a great deal froIn jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In SOfile cases they will pose
a significant limitation, in others not. Transfer taxes often apply principally
to real estate. Partnerships, rather than S corporations, have always been the
preferred vehicle in which to hold real estate. 356 Accordingly, transfer taxes
m.ay pose less of a burden than appears at first blush. One also hopes that
states will follow the Congressional lead, and permit S corporations to liquidate without a significant tax iOl.pact. As discussed above, states can assist this
process by perfilitting direct entity conversions of corporations into LLCs,
thereby avoiding transfer tax and transfer restriction problefils that might
otherwise arise. 357
B. C Corporations

For newly form.ed C corporations electing to be taxed under Subchapter K,
rules will need to be developed that track the section 704(b} allocation rules
with the m.ultiple classes of stock possible in a C corporation. Other special
issues Inay arise, but they should be manageable. A separate question arises
for existing nonpublic C corporations wishing to elect Subchapter K, (or
disregarded entity status). How should they get from here to there? It does
not seem. equitable for them or their owners to pay a substantial tax penalty
to get into the entity of choice of the day, a choice that m.ay not even have

354

See LR.C. § 751(a).
ee BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10. !! 12.21, 12.61[2].

355S

356An exception is when the capital gain freeze technique is used. See supra text accoITlpanying notes 192-202.
357 See supra teXt accompanying notes 183-85.
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been available at the time they w-ere formed. Therefore, if it does not break the
back of the fisc, I recommend that qualifying, existing C corporations also be
allowed to follow- the sam.e procedures as described above for S corporations,
that is, during the ten-year w-indow-, to liquidate under Subchapter K. As
Subchapter C is continuing, I do not make this approach mandatory as I do
for S corporations. It would be almost impossible to keep track of C corporations liquidating for independent reasons and those liquidating to continue
under Subchapter K. Thus, C corporations have the option of liquidating
under the current rules, which they will prefer if overall it generates losses. 358
As noted above, under the current rules, gain and possibly loss is recognized on an actual liquidation, but the earnings and profits account is normally w-iped clean. 359 Thus, what the fisc is giving up under my proposal is
not the tax on dividend income, which in the case of a liquidation it w-ill not
collect, but the tax on the net gains inherent in the assets of some nonpublicly
traded C corporations. I say some, because many corporations w-ill not sell or
distribute many of those assets if it means paying a tax. Further, for domestic
transactions, at least, C corporations are not a popular vehicle for non public
businesses. LLCs have become the entity of choice. 360 It will be important for
the number crunchers to crunch the nUInbers, but the cost to the fisc may
not be that high.
Some will view- my proposal as an unduly liberal giveaway. And indeed, as
I discuss below, its cost may be too high. But there are also economic inefficiencies that are created when some taxpayers are forced to operate within an
outdated form and others are not. New businesses forming LLCs have a competitive advantage over older businesses trapped in C corporations. Electing
S corporation status may not be available if their ownership structure does
not permit a single class of stock. Leveling the playing field should make for
a more efficient economy.
If the costs to the fisc of my proposal for existing C corporations are too
high, a simple solution, and probably as reasonable as any, is simply to leave
the current rules for liquidating C corporations in effect with one adjustment.
That is to say, existing nonpublic C corporations may, during the ten-year
window, elect Subchapter K or disregarded entity status, but if they do so
they are deemed to liquidate under Subchapter C, recognizing the gains and
possibly the losses per its rules. 361 The adjustment: To limit the tax pain, I
propose that the taxes owed be payable over five years.
Whichever of these rules are used for existing C corporations, they should
only apply during the ten-year window. To allow these tax benefits for C corporations that liquidate after the ten-year window is to permit them to have
is not out of the question that they will prefer it in a gain situation, as it means a basis
step up.
359I.R.C. § 336; BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10,' 10.05[2][b]. See supra text accompanying note 305.
36iJSeesupra text accompanying notes 19-35.67-108.
361 See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
358 It
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their cake and eat it to~ using Subchapter C when it is beneficial and switching to Subchapter K when it is not~ indefinitely.
Assuming a favorable environment in which qualifying C corporations can
elect Subchapter K at a low tax cost, will the LLC revolution be reversed or
at least slowed? Rather than forming LLCs, will taxpayers form corporations
and elect Subchapter K? While this is not necessarily a bad thing, it is not a
likelihood for nontax reasons. State LLC statutes have more modern, flexible
statutory architectures in comparison to typical corporate statutes. 362 Indeed,
many who prefer for whatever reason to operate in C corporations for tax
purposes often form LLCs and then check the box to be taxed as C corporations to take advantage of the greater state law flexibility LLCs offers. 363
Further, it is safer to be in an LLC if Congress changes its mind. Congress is
more likely to change the way state law corporations are taxed than the way
LLCs are taxed~ given the history of each.
Conversely, would it make sense to only allow the use of C corporations
for corporations that are publicly held or are about to go public? My recommendations are an attempt to put all businesses on the same playing field,
but some could opt to use or stay with C corporations. Should that option
be available? Generally, the answer is yes. C corporations are too woven into
the economic fabric to not allow people to use them. For example, as noted
earlier, C corporations are often preferred for outbound foreign transactions
because of the preferential tax rates many treaties give dividends, and preferred for inbound transactions due to the imperfections with the branch
profits tax. 364 But, C corporations are reported to often be used for an extra
run up the rate brackets, and that likely will become a more common reason
for using C corporations in a tax universe where LLCs are otherwise usually
the more logical choice. 365 At the sam.e time, taxpayers making legitimate
use of C corporations should not have a radically different tax structure than
individuals. As a compromise position, and to help offset possible revenue
losses from my proposals, I recommend that the 150/0 corporate bracket of
section 11 be eliminated, and thus that the tax rate on the first $75,000 of
income be 250/0.

C. 7he States
I have already discussed the need for states to cooperate with this process. A
related question is whether states will use the new single tax burden on (at
least most) closely held business entities as an opportunity to increase their
own taxes. That is to some extent already going on. An increasing number of

supra note 17. ! 1.02.
363LLCs can also elect to be taxed as S corporations. See l.RS. Form 2553.
364 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
365 See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
362 See BISHOP &

KLEINBERGER.
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states are taxing LLCs at the entity level. 366 While this trend .may continue~ it
does not provide a reason for the federal government not to establish a more
rational tax systern.. The 50 states and the District of Columbia compete with
one another. Let that competition and their voters determine their tax systems.

XI.X.. Conclusion
The repeal of Subchapter S is justified both on grounds of tax efficiency and
political realism.. The country does not need two pass-through business entity
tax regiITles, and only the repeal of Subchapter S is politically realistic. A few
relatively modest Code changes permit the important, defensible benefits of
Subchapter S to be retained. The repeal of Subchapter S allows the Service to
make better use of its personnel. It also makes for readier reforITl of Subchapter
K. The Treasury and Congress, their attention no longer divided between two
tax systeITlS, and their liITlited human resources no longer spread as thin, can
bring greater focus to that task. Finally, the tiITle has COITle to allow nonpublic
C corporations to elect Subchapter K as well, ideally on a taxpayer-friendly
basis. Shareholders should not be trapped with an antiquated choice.

See Bruce P. Ely, Christopher R Grissom, & Matthew S. Houser, Charts Comparing ~he
State Tax Treatment of LLCs and LLPs, in LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK § 3: 118
(Mark Sargent & Walter Schwidetzky eds., 2008).
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